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SOLVING PROBLEMS VS. CLAIMING RIGHTS: THE
PRAGMATIST CHALLENGE TO LEGAL LIBERALISM
WILLIAM H. SIMON*
Recent developments in both theory and practice have inspired a
new understanding of public interest lawyering. The theoretical
development is an intensified interest in Pragmatism. The practical
development is the emergence of a style of social reform that seeks
to institutionalize the Pragmatist vision of democratic governance as
learning and experimentation. This style is reflected in a variety of
innovative responses to social problems, including drug courts,
ecosystem management, and "new accountability" educational
reform. The new understanding represents a significant challenge to
an influential view of law among politically liberal lawyers over the
past fifty years. That view, Legal Liberalism, is less a creature of
academic theory than an implicit popular jurisprudence ofpracticing
lawyers. It consists of a cluster of ideas associated with the Warren
Court, the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Ralph Nader,
and the legal aid and public defender movements. This Article seeks
to reconsider Legal Liberalism in the light of the Pragmatist
approach and to offer a tentative appraisal of the newcomer. It begins
by explicating the sometimes tacit premises of Legal Liberalism and
exploring its shortcomings. It then introduces the contrasting
premises of the Pragmatist approach as they appear in a variety of
recent works of legal scholarship. It illustrates the Pragmatist
approach with a discussion of two case studies - one of drug courts
and one of"second generation" employment discrimination remedies.
It concludes with some comments about the ambiguities and
limitations of Legal Pragmatism.
* Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University. I am grateful for advice and
support from Alan Morrison, Scott Cummings, Charles Sabel, Michael Dart, Jim Liebman,
Orly Lobel, Brad Karkkainen, and Archon Fung, and participants in a workshop at the
University of Wisconsin Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
The conventions of judicial and academic discourse encourage
legal writing to affect a position above politics. The writer appeals
to interpretations of authoritative texts and public values as if they
were shared across political perspectives. In fact, of course, both
premises and conclusions are hotly contested in most areas of legal
discussion, and in many areas they correlate strongly with recogniz-
able political positions. We often think of the political distinction
between conservatives and liberals as a central axis of legal
controversy.
In this Article, I propose to relax the conventions and focus
directly and explicitly on the liberal political perspective from
which a large fraction of the bar, and an even larger fraction of
the academy, argue in order to examine an interesting development
within that perspective. This is the emergence of a new liberal
approach to legal issues in substantial tension with, and sometimes
openly hostile to, the best-known older approach. The older
approach can be called Legal Liberalism. There is no canonical
definition of Legal Liberalism, but we know it when we see it. Its
tacit indicia include predispositions in favor of plaintiffs in tort and
civil rights cases, defendants in criminal cases, consumers in
commercial cases, and workers in employment cases. Its explicit
elements include the positions and ideas conventionally associated
with the Warren Court, the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
Ralph Nader, and the legal aid and public defender movements.
Until recently, criticism of these ideas has tended to come from
outside the more general political orientation with which Legal
Liberalism is associated. Legal liberals are liberals in the broader
political sense that connotes, first, a scheme of values that gives
priority to moderate versions of equality and liberty, and second, a
position on the American political spectrum between the middle and
the far left. Most criticism of Legal Liberalism has come from
conservatives, who tend to dispute the priority liberalism gives to
liberty or equality, or from radicals, who tend to dispute liberalism's
moderation.
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There have been occasional episodes in which a particular tenet
of Legal Liberalism has been challenged from within political
liberalism. Such disputes tend to generate a good deal of interest
and tension. In 1976, for example, Derrick Bell criticized the
NAACP's school desegregation strategy as sacrificing the interests
of urban blacks in sound education and political efficacy to an
ineffectual and dogmatic conception of rights.' More recently, a
liberal critique has argued that due process protections for criminal
defendants associated with the Warren Court unjustifiably impede
minority communities from organizing to protect vital interests in
neighborhood security.2
A more comprehensive critique in a similar spirit is implicit in a
growing body of legal studies invoking or reflecting the tenets of
Pragmatism. As philosophical doctrine, Pragmatism is noted for
its insistence that thought is instrumental (the truth or value of
an assertion lies, not in its correspondence with some ultimate
reality, but in what it can do for us) and contextual (assertions
should be interpreted in the social circumstances in which they
arise). As political theory, especially as elaborated by John Dewey,
Pragmatism is noted for its commitment to, and understanding of,
democracy as a process of collaborative inquiry and learning.3 Its
theoretical commitments lead Pragmatism to resist approaches to
legal issues that rely primarily on abstract analytical schemes and
methods. Its institutional commitments lead it to resist arrange-
ments that are either centralized and unaccountable on the one
hand or anarchically diffuse on the other.
It is doubtful whether, in the abstract, any of these precepts
pose serious trouble for Legal Liberalism. Yet, some recent writing
has pursued them, not in the abstract, but through studies of
innovative responses to social problems. The studies find the
Pragmatist spirit in a variety of experiments, including drug courts,
ecosystem management, "new accountability" educational reform,
1. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 478-82 (1976).
2. E.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of
Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY CoMMuNrrITs 8-30
(Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999).
3. See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 143-219 (1927); ROBERT B.
WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150-94, 319-73 (1991).
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community policing, international labor standards enforcement,
employment discrimination remediation regimes, and health
disparity collaboratives, among many others. The studies have led
to both particular conclusions and general programmatic ap-
proaches that challenge Legal Liberal premises. The perspective of
these studies is by no means the only possible legal version of
Pragmatism, but it is the most fully elaborated one.4
In Part I, I offer a picture of Legal Liberalism, inferred from the
dominant tendencies of liberal lawyers' rhetoric of the last fifty
years. Because I am interested in the implicit jurisprudence of
practicing lawyers more than in academic theory, I have relied as
much on journalism and casual observation as I have on scholar-
ship. In Part II, I formulate some of the principal objections to this
doctrine from a variety of perspectives, more or less pragmatist in
spirit. Part III elaborates the alternative perspective of Legal
Pragmatism, and Part IV illustrates it with two recent studies--one
4. My picture of Legal Pragmatism is based on IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE DEREGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE REGULATION DEBATE (1992); ABRAM CHAYES
& ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SovEIiGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999); SIDNEY SHAPIRO & ROBERT
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); ROBERTO
MANAGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998); Michael
C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) [hereinafter Dorf & Sabel, Drug Courts); Michael
C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267 (1998); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); James
S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183 (2002);
Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in
the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001); Louise G. Trubek &
Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare Governance in Transition, 19 AM. J. L. & MED. 395
(2003).
My apologies to authors included here who feel that my portrait of Legal Pragmatism does
not do justice to the distinctive virtues of their works, and to the authors of many works
omitted who might identify their efforts with it. I have deliberately omitted those for whom
the term pragmatism is simply a synonym for utilitarianism, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
151-53 (1986), or for philistinism, RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 49-50
(2003). See Michael Sullivan & Daniel Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical?: Richard Posner
and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687 (2003) (contrasting Dewey's pragmatism with the
legal theories of Posner and, in passing, Dworkin).
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of drug courts by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel and another of
sexual harassment litigation by Susan Sturm. In Part V, I consider
some limitations of, or objections to, the pragmatist approach.
I. LEGAL LIBERALISM: AN EXPOSITION
Legal Liberalism consists of six mutually reinforcing premises.
Three are background premises-the Victim Perspective, Populism,
and the Priority of Rights. Three are practical and strategic. They
involve orientations toward the control of information, the choice of
legal form between rules and standards, and the structure of
procedure.'
A. Background Premises
1. The Victim Perspective
Legal Liberalism sees law as fundamentally concerned with the
needs of the wounded and vulnerable. It tends to conflate the realm
of law with that of compassion. Among traditional litigants, it is
presumptively solicitous of tort plaintiffs and criminal defendants.
More recently, the presumption has extended to civil rights
plaintiffs and it has sought to extend legal protection to successive
new classes of wounded and vulnerable, including abused women,
children, the elderly, the mentally ill, the disabled, mistreated
workers and tenants, and welfare recipients.6
5. Legal Liberalism is a heuristic designed to capture the more prominent tendencies in
the discourse of liberal lawyers. Although I think Legal Liberalism is the most influential
perspective, I do not suggest it has been the only perspective among liberal lawyers. Just as
not all liberal lawyers accept this perspective, all those who accept it are not liberals. Indeed,
in my experience, politically radical lawyers, who reject the broader political orientation of
liberalism, usually think of lawyering in Legal Liberal terms. There is no more reliable
expounder of Legal Liberalism than the journal of the National Lawyers' Guild, The Guild
Practitioner. Radical lawyers have never developed a distinctive conception of practice.
6. The Victim Perspective is most often an unstated assumption, but there is a
substantial literature arguing for it explicitly. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987). For
an overview of the literature, see Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1283 (2002).
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The Victim Perspective does not exactly repudiate the traditional
premise that law must do justice even when justice is in tension
with compassion. Its solicitude for the weak and injured, however,
plays a strong background role. It motivates the expansion of law
into new domains, and it operates as a presumption in cases of
ambiguity or uncertainty. For example, when there is uncertainty
about social facts, such as whether the death penalty deters crime
or welfare causes family break-up or unemployment, the Victim
Perspective resolves such doubts in favor of defendants and
recipients generally. In cases of adjudicative facts-the facts of
particular disputes, such as whether Clarence Thomas harassed
Anita Hill in the manner she alleged-the Victim Perspective
resolves such doubts in favor of the more vulnerable contestant.
Finally, the Victim Perspective tends to privilege the interpretive
constructs that vulnerable people apply to the world over those more
commonly adopted by the less vulnerable. If, for example, women
experience sexual harassment as part of an organized structure of
systemic disadvantage at work, while their employers understand
it as a series of isolated, aberrant misfortunes, the former fact alone
supports adopting the systemic view.
The Victim Perspective is so ingrained in the discourse of liberal
lawyers that we may forget that it is a recent innovation, even
within liberalism. In the liberalism of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century, legal rights were associated most basically with the
bourgeois property owner. The nineteenth century labor movement
was ambivalent as to whether its members' interests would be
served by conceiving and protecting them as legal rights.7 Regard-
less of how it came out on this issue, the labor movement's core
projects of organization and bargaining were not designed to protect
the most vulnerable members of society, at least not directly. These
projects were designed mainly for able-bodied working-age adults,
and more often than not, only white, male, and skilled ones. Often,
the movement anticipated many indirect and long-term benefits to
others from its projects, but it also recognized that these projects
imposed short-term costs on some of the most vulnerable people. For
example, the exclusionary work and immigration practices it
7. See generally WILIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 1-9 (1991).
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favored deprived some of employment for the benefit of better-off
workers. The idea that rights have a distinctive affinity with
extreme vulnerability is entirely foreign to this perspective. The
Progressives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
did focus on the protection of vulnerable groups such as the
unemployed, women, children, the elderly, and mentally ill. As
recent liberals complain insistently, however, the Progressives
tended not to formulate their projects in terms of legal rights, as
Legal Liberalism understands them, but rather in terms of pater-
nalistic discretion.8
2. Populism
The second predisposition of Legal Liberalism is a deep distrust
of large institutions, especially governments and big business
corporations. This distrust generates extreme sensitivity to the
corruptions of power and wealth. The stereotypes of the government
official and the corporate executive portray the primary motivations
of the former as power and lust, and that of the latter as greed.
"Today it is the combined power of government and the corpora-
tions that presses against the individual," Charles Reich wrote in
the seminal academic contribution to Legal Liberalism.9 The closing
arguments and after-dinner speeches of tort plaintiffs' lawyers
routinely contrast the virtues and vulnerabilities of "the people" or
"the little man" with the rapacities of corporations or the state.'°
The philosopher David Luban, a leading theorist of legal ethics,
asserts that "the real value underlying the advocate's role is the
protection of individuals against institutions that pose chronic
8. See, e.g., ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
(1969).
9. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 773 (1964).
10. In the words of one plaintiffs' lawyer,
[w]hen a warrior for the people demonstrates he can sometimes beat the king's
favorites, the corporate giant, the money makers, that he can free the accused
once safely in the clutches of the king-such a warrior stands for the proposition
that the little men can win and little warriors for the people can survive in the
courtroom....
GERALD L. SPENCE & ANTHONY POLK, GUNNING FOR JUSTICE 386 (1982).
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threats to their well-being," a category in which he includes all
government and big business institutions.1
The political doctrine that emphasizes the pervasive corruption
of institutions is Populism. Populism juxtaposes the corruption of
institutions to the virtue of unorganized individuals, and portrays
the role of political leaders as largely defensive and redistributive,
focused on checking the excesses of organized elites in order to
provide benefits for unorganized citizens. 2 There is some analogy
between the role of unorganized citizens and political leaders in the
Populist political vision, and the role within Legal Liberalism for
trial lawyers, perhaps judges, and above all, juries. Trial lawyers,
judges, and juries have in common their relative independence from
the constraints, and presumably corruptions, of large institutions.
In particular, the jury, as a temporary assembly of ordinary
individuals who are only minimally accountable to surrounding
institutions, represents the Populist anti-institutional ideal
incarnate.
3. The Priority of Rights
We also find in Legal Liberalism a commitment to formulating
certain fundamental norms as rights, and to insisting on the
priority of these norms over other values. Rights are analytical,
individualistic, categorical, judicially enforceable, and corrective.
Rights are derived analytically by the application of legal
reasoning to authoritative sources. Although they are ultimately
grounded in social consensus, the derivation of specific conclusions
in contested cases requires specialized methods and institutions. As
courts and lawyers play a predominant role, the most important
part of that role consists of a mode of reasoning that generates
specific conclusions of entitlement.
Rights are individualistic; they protect autonomy. They have in
general the quality that Reich ascribed specifically to property:
11. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal, and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellman, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1019, 1028 (1990).
12. See ALAN BRNKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST. HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHIN, AND THE
GREAT DEPRESSION, 161-68 (1982).
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Property draws a circle around the activities of each individual
or organization. Within that circle the individual has a greater
degree of freedom than without. Outside he must justify or
explain his activities and show his authority. Within he is
master, and the state must explain or justify any interference.
There must be sanctuaries or enclaves where no majority can
reach. 3
There is no consensus within Legal Liberalism on the exact
content of the category of rights, but the rights idea has an affinity
with individual interests in privacy and physical autonomy, with
claims against state interference with individual action, and with
the protection of established entitlements. 4
The idea of "enclaves where no majority can reach" also connotes
the categorical quality of rights.'" Rights differ from other norms in
being less susceptible to trade-offs and balancing. For some, rights
are "trumps" that compel recognition and conclude discussion. 6 For
others, rights have a vaguer priority; they yield only to exception-
ally weighty non-rights values. In any case, to designate something
as a right is to imply that it has presumptive priority over some
competing set of values.
Further, a right strongly implies, if it does not entail, judicial
definition and enforcement. The remission of rights enforcement to
even a relatively benign administrative structure, such as the
Department of Veterans Affairs in its dealings with veterans, is
deeply suspect. Even more so is their remission to private institu-
tions: for example, through the easy enforcement of contractual
arbitration clauses. The central judicial role implies an exemption
from the general Populist suspicion of institutions for judges as well
as juries. Legal Liberalism is rife with idealized portrayals of the
judicial role and sentimental homages to particular judges. For
example, the role of the judicial clerkship as a paternalistic
13. Reich, supra note 9, at 787.
14. In The New Property, Reich used several images suggesting the physical autonomy
interpretation, such as the New York case that denied welfare benefits to a man who insisted,
against the instructions of welfare officers, on sleeping in a barn in a pile of rags. Id. at 758.
When he came to formulate his conception of right explicitly, however, he emphasized
protection for vested economic benefits. Id. at 785-86.
15. Id. at 787.
16. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977).
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initiation ritual for elite academics contributes to this tendency. In
a less romantic vein, the judiciary is simply the "least dangerous
branch"; the one whose institutional constraints limit its capacity
for corruption and dispose it to rights enforcement.
Finally, rights with monetary remedies are typically grounded in
corrective justice-the rectification of past wrongs at the expense of
those deemed responsible for them. Legal Liberalism tends to
presume that injurious wrongdoing ought to give rise to claims for
redress against the wrongdoer. We see this in the attachment to the
tort system as opposed to no-fault compensation systems. We see it
as well in the position that currently disadvantaged people whose
position is due to an injustice that they or their ancestors suffered
under prior legal regimes receive "reparations" from surviving
corporate and governmental institutions that bear responsibility. 7
17. See, e.g., Robert F. Worth, Companies Are Sued for Slave Reparations, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2002, at B2.
There is a key exception to the Legal Liberal attitude toward rights: the labor law of
collective bargaining. The labor law that came down from the New Deal is distinctive in the
extent to which it restricts conventional individual rights in the interests of collective power.
For example, it permits non-union members to be bound by union actions without their
consent, and it deprives workers of individual enforcement rights with respect to many key
interests, remitting them to rights within the union. The idea is that effective joint action
requires a limitation of individual autonomy. For decades, liberals generally supported this
regime as a half-acknowledged exception to their commitment to individual rights. The rights-
based critiques of labor law tended to come from conservatives. The phrase "right to work,"
meaning the right to be hired without having to pay dues to a union, has definite reactionary
connotations. The civil rights movement partially discredited the New Deal regime because
of the unions' pervasive mistreatment of minority and women workers under that regime. It
was easy to win liberal support for rights of minority and women workers to bring challenges
to union discrimination directly to the courts. Outside of race and gender issues, however, full-
scale liberal challenges to the collectivist premises of the New Deal regime were rare. Perhaps
the clearest one did not appear until 1980. See Staughton Lynd, Government Without Rights:
The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDuS. REL. L.J. 483 (1980).
Labor law and unions, however, have ceased to play the central role they once did in liberal
thought. In law schools, this means that virtually the only course in which the individualist
premises of the liberal commitment to rights are systematically put in question from the
perspective of the left is one that most students, even most politically-engaged left-leaning
students, do not take. (I say "virtually" because there is another exception-the law of Native
American tribal relations-but that course has always been marginal.).
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B. Operating Premises
1. Procedural Individuation and Differentiation
The first operating premise of Legal Liberalism is that disputed
facts on which a claim of right depends be determined in a distinc-
tive manner. This manner is the adjudicatory hearing. Ideally, such
a hearing involves a personal appearance by the claimant, represen-
tation by a lawyer, oral evidence, cross-examination, and a legally-
trained professional decision maker with substantial independence
from both market and bureaucratic pressures.18
This relatively elaborate and expensive procedure is valuable in
part as the most effective means of enforcing claims of right. Rights
enforcement is important in itself, and because it has some
deterrent effect that induces potential defendants to comply with
legal requirements in their general course of conduct. The liberal
commitment to adjudication, however, is founded on more than
accurate decision making and deterrence. Adjudicatory participa-
tion has an intrinsic value. The opportunity to have one's day in
court, or in a diluted administrative variation, is asserted to be an
important satisfaction, even to those who are unsuccessful on the
merits. Adjudication serves "dignitary" values and expresses respect
for the claimant.
Adjudication in this view is an individual procedure. The dignity
in question is that of an individual participating alone or through
a representative committed only to her in a proceeding concerning
a right peculiar to her. At least this is the paradigm. The forms of
collective adjudication, including aggregate settlements, consoli-
dated trials, and class actions, are innovations whose contours are
substantially undefined and whose legitimacy is contested precisely
because they depart from individual claim determination. To the
extent that they permit conclusive determination of rights without
opportunities for direct participation by claimants and without
claimant control of lawyers, they generate a good deal of anxiety
within Legal Liberalism.
18. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus forAdministrativeAdjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28
(1976).
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A further feature of this perspective is that adjudication is
strongly differentiated from administration. Dispute resolution
processes have little resemblance to routine decision-making
processes and are structurally separate from them. Adjudicatory
processes are more elaborate and more individual, while routine
decision making is summary and wholesale. Legal regulation
focuses largely on the dispute processes, and is relatively uninter-
ested in routine decision making until routine decisions become
disputes.
The separation of administration and adjudication is reinforced
by the adjudicatory ideal of the decision maker. The adjudicator is
supposed to be someone not involved in the original decision and
not subject to supervision by anyone who is involved. Ideally, he is
to have substantial independence from those who enact the norms
that he is applying, and he is to have the legal training to differenti-
ate his background from those making administrative decisions.
The paradigmatic adjudicatory institutions, the courts, thus enjoy
unique organizational autonomy. Even in the broad range of
administrative adjudications within public and private bureaucra-
cies, however, the adjudicatory processes are typically strongly
separated from the administrative ones.19
2. Rules and Standards
A pervasive dialectic of modern legal thought arises from the
opposition of rules and standards. 0 A rule is a norm that strictly
limits the range of factors that the decision maker can consider and
characteristically dictates a particular decision upon a finding of
one or a few basic facts. A standard mandates that the decision
maker vindicate a more general value by considering the full range
of relevant facts in the context in which the dispute arises. "Do not
drive over 65 miles per hour" is a rule, while "do not drive unsafely"
is a standard. Rules have an over- and underinclusive quality. They
sometimes require the decision maker to decide in a way that is
inconsistent with the ultimate purposes of the rule. Standards have
19. See PHILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A
GoVERNMENT AGENCY 125-243 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1975).
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an indeterminate quality. Since they enlarge the range of relevance,
they tend to make for more expensive enforcement procedures
and create controversy about how they should be applied, even to
undisputed facts.
The dialectic of rules and standards is not unique to Legal
Liberalism, but it has an especially strong resonance there. On the
one hand, there is both a moral and a social cost to the under- and
overinclusiveness of rules. Underinclusiveness means that there is
no sanction for socially obnoxious conduct or no assistance for a
socially recognized need that does not come within the terms of the
rule. Overinclusiveness means that we penalize otherwise accept-
able or desirable conduct or reward undeserving conduct just
because it does come within the terms of the rule. Such results
potentially involve a sacrifice of social welfare, justice, and solidar-
ity. This intuition led the Warren Court to flirt with the
"irrebutable presumption" doctrine. In United States Department of
Agriculture v. Murry, the Court rejected a Food Stamp rule that
denied eligibility to a household when any member had been
declared as a dependent on the tax return of a non-member.2' The
Court viewed the rule as presuming irrebutably and unreasonably,
first, that the taxpayer was supporting the putative dependent and,
second, that he was supporting the remaining household
members.22 It then went on to suggest that the Constitution might
invalidate any such regulatory overbreadth to the extent that it
deprived a poor person of a basic need.23 Upon reflection, the Court
backed off.24 The consequences of such a doctrine would have been
too drastic. The legal system depends pervasively on rules. It
requires them in order to reduce decision-making costs and to
restrain individual discretion to make complex judgments.
The response to this dilemma in Legal Liberalism consists of
three tendencies. First, there is a preference for standards for
decision makers who are presumed trustworthy and a preference for
rules for those who are presumed untrustworthy. The most salient
trusted class is the judiciary. In general, Legal Liberalism has
21. 413 U.S. 508 (1978).
22. Id. at 512-13.
23. Id. at 513-14 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
24. See id. at 514; Note, The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1974).
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favored broad contextual decision-making power for judges under
norms like due process, reasonableness, public convenience and
necessity, and just cause. The most salient distrusted class is the
police. Thus, we have the Miranda rule.
Second, rules are acceptable, and even desirable, when the costs
of under- or overinclusion are borne by nondisadvantaged people.
The costs of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases are borne by the
prosecution, rather than the class of criminal defendants favored by
Legal Liberalism. The costs of strict liability in tort, a rule-like
norm, are borne by defendant corporations, rather than the favored
class of plaintiffs.25 A rule-like welfare system of child allowances
or a negative income tax is preferred to a standards-like means-
tested system on the assumption that the State bears the costs of
overinclusion of the former.
Third, where the law gives institutions power over ordinary
people, standards should exist to allow the latter to raise the full
range of pertinent social values that weigh against the adverse
exercise of such power in the circumstances of the particular case.
This means broad defenses of fraud, duress, mistake, and
unconscionability in contract. It means just cause standards for job
dismissal and eviction. It means tort recovery for pain and suffering
and emotional distress, as well as material loss.
3. Confidentiality and Bilateral Information Control
Liberal legal practice is characterized by strong confidentiality
safeguards and an emphasis on the role of lawyers in the strategic
control of information. The most salient norms here are the strong
attorney-client evidentiary privilege, the ethical duty of confidenti-
ality, and rules of civil procedure that require the disclosure of
disadvantageous material information only when the opposing
party is able to formulate a demand for it. The bar's confidentiality
rule is an extreme one that requires the lawyer to withhold
information in a broad range of situations where disclosure might
remedy substantial injustice. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
deny important information merely because the opposing party is
25. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Notions in Tort and
Contract Law with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power,
41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982).
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unable to formulate an adequate demand for it, most likely because
that party lacks sufficient awareness of the nature of the informa-
tion.26
More broadly, this approach gives the lawyer the role, once the
possibility of dispute arises, of gatekeeper between the client and
the outside world. At least presumptively, the client is supposed to
cease direct or unilateral communications with outsiders. In
discovery and often in regulatory compliance, the lawyer takes
charge of disclosure functions. The attorney-client privilege
encourages firms to put lawyers in charge of investigations of
possibly illegal conduct in order to minimize the possibility of
involuntary disclosure of the findings. Lawyers accompany parties
and even nonparty witnesses to depositions and tell them that they
must not volunteer information. Lawyers instruct and rehearse
clients extensively for trial. Once the very prospect of litigation
arises, the client is instructed not to communicate about the matter
even in contexts unrelated to the litigation. Injury victims, prospec-
tive tort and criminal defendants, and even witnesses routinely tell
journalists that their lawyers have told them not to talk about the
case, and this is usually accepted as a satisfactory explanation for
their silence.
We have grown accustomed to the sight of witnesses at congres-
sional hearings, even those who have little prospect of being joined
in related litigation, appearing with and intermittently consulting
lawyers. No one thought it at all remarkable, for example, that
Anita Hill, herself a lawyer, appeared for her testimony in the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearing with a battery of lawyers,
even though there was little prospect of ensuing litigation and her
role, in theory, was just to give a straightforward lay account of
events she had observed.
The gatekeeper function is supposed to play a role in protecting
various privacy rights of the client. The most important of these is
the privilege against self-incrimination. This rationale, however,
has limited relevance. In many situations, there are no relevant
privacy rights, aside from those that attach to the attorney-client
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (establishing the discovery rule requiring production without
request only for a narrow range of information); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2003) (prescribing the confidentiality duty); JOHN HENRYWIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2292
(Chadbourne rev. ed., 1981) (discussing the evidentiary privilege).
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relation itself. In these situations, the lawyer's information control
function is explained as serving social interests in accurate
disclosure. We get more disclosure because clients who are assured
of their lawyers' loyalty make more disclosure to their lawyers, and
lawyers persuade and assist clients to pass on the information to
the extent required by law.27 Moreover, we get more concise and
accurate disclosure to the extent that the lawyer is able to shape it
to remove redundancy and ambiguity.
The idea of lawyer control of information is related to a litigation
procedure dominated by a trial format that is characterized by
orality, continuity, and concentration. Unlike procedure in civil law
countries, the paradigmatic Anglo-American trial is a single,
continuous event, rather than a series of discrete evidentiary
proceedings.2 It typically takes place in a short period of time,
nearly always occupies only a small fraction of the course of the
entire litigation, and emphasizes oral testimony by witnesses
present in court.
Of course, a trial is a rare thing in American litigation, as most
cases are settled. Trials, however, remain the default procedure in
the absence of settlement, and the prospect of trial is an overwhelm-
ing influence on settlement. Legal Liberalism celebrates this kind
of trial as a powerful safeguard of justice.
The Anglo-American trial reinforces the role of the lawyer as
gatekeeper. Proceedings of this sort put a high premium on
extensive preparation and precise execution, as a litigant has a
single, intensely focused opportunity to make her case. Mistakes or
bad impressions are relatively hard to correct. The trier has a
limited opportunity to absorb the case, therefore, clarity and
coherence of presentation are critical. The tradition of the adversary
system mandates relative passivity on the part of the judge and
constrains her ability to assist the litigants directly in presenting
their cases. Under these circumstances, the dominance of profes-
sional advocates is inevitable.
Moreover, this procedure encourages lawyer control prior to the
trial. The compression of the trial means that a single piece of
evidence can have a large impact. Nuance is often lost, and
27. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CoNDucT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003).
28. See generally John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823 (1985).
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sophisticated explanations are not always possible. The Anglo-
American trial is in some respects a battle of sound bites. The
procedure thus creates the risk that a prior statement, when offered
in evidence, out-of-context and shorn of nuance, will create a
misleadingly adverse impression at trial that was not anticipated
at the time it was made. The impression may be hard to correct and
may require the expenditure of scarce time and effort to do so. This
kind of risk justifies the lawyer in advising the client to forego
independent communication about the circumstances at issue.
Notice that partisan control at' trial and partisan witness
preparation reinforce each other. Partisan witness preparation
leads to distrust of witnesses, which leads to giving opposing
counsel great latitude in cross-examination. Anticipation of the
distorting effects of hostile cross-examination, however, intensifies
the need for witness preparation.
II. A LIBERAL CRITIQUE OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
Legal Liberalism remains the dominant perspective of a broad
segment of the bar, but there is less confidence and more unease
about it than there once was, as evidenced by the now familiar
critiques. One critique objects that a program focusing on rights
without devoting proportionate attention to corresponding duties
undermines the moral and institutional basis for productive social
cooperation.29 In other words, rights consciousness diverts attention
from the kinds of altruistic effort and self-restraint that society has
a right to expect from even its disadvantaged members. Although
this point may seem smug when voiced from a position of upper-
class privilege, it has been voiced increasingly in recent years from
among the disadvantaged themselves. If criminal defendants tend
to be disadvantaged, so do the victims of crime, we are reminded.
Some leaders of poor communities have expressed sympathy for the
idea that an emphasis on rights to welfare, for example, may
impede development of the initiative and self-discipline needed to
attain economic self-sufficiency. 0
29. E.g., RIcHARD E. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR TIME
1-11 (1984).
30. See, e.g., George Packer, A Tale of Two Movements, THE NATION, Dec. 14, 1998, at 19.
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Another critique asserts that the recognition and even enforce-
ment of legal rights for the disadvantaged is unlikely to signifi-
cantly improve their well-being in the absence of reforms funda-
mentally altering the distribution of wealth and power. Such an
upheaval is not part of the Legal Liberal agenda, and its tools of
rights creation and enforcement would be inadequate to it. In the
absence of fundamental redistributive change, however, economic
and political inequality will swamp the effects of liberal rights
expansion. Sellers of goods or services will respond to consumer
protection doctrines by raising their prices or ceasing to deal with
poor consumers. Employers will respond to restraints on arbitrary
or discriminatory discharges by hiring less. Middle-class whites will
respond to desegregation decrees by moving to the suburbs.
Government agencies will respond to conditions on their adminis-
tration of programs by shutting the programs down or by shifting
resources from areas where they have discretion in order to comply
with judicial commands in other areas.3
There have been strong replies to these critiques from within
Legal Liberalism,32 but both remain important and, on some points,
powerful. At present, I want to consider some criticisms more
grounded in the basic commitments of political liberalism. These
criticisms do not assert the futility of redistributive reform. Even
though they invoke notions of duty and responsibility, they do not
do so in the name of hierarchy or conformity, but rather in the
interest of effective democratic collective action on the part of the
disadvantaged.
31. There are conservative and radical versions of this critique, depending on whether
fundamental change is viewed as bad or good. See, e.g., DONALD HOROWriz, THE COURTS AND
SOcIAL PoLIcY (1977) (articulating the conservative version); Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha
Program, in THE MARx-ENGLS READER 525-41 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978)(presenting the radical version). A critique more characteristic of recent radical writing argues
that liberal legal thought reinforces a culture of alienation that demobilizes and disorients the
disadvantaged. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Jay Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQuE 497-510 (David Kairys ed., 3rd ed. 1998). The
Legal Pragmatist critique is closer to this one, but focuses on institutional structures at least
as much as rhetoric and consciousness.
32. For a response to the virtue critique, see Gerald P. Lopez, A Declaration of War by
Other Means, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1985) (reviewing MORGAN, supra note 29). For a
response to one application of the ineffectuality critique, see Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of
the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: 'Milking' and Class Violence, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 485 (1987). The Legal Pragmatist studies cited supra note 4 are full of counter-
examples to the ineffectuality critique.
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A. The Anti-Policy Bias of Rights Talk33
As conventionally used, right does not connote simply any
important value. It works rhetorically to privilege a subset of values
and to bias consideration of competing ones. In particular, this bias
works against collective as opposed to individual values, against
values that require public support as opposed to noninterference,
against new as opposed to established benefits, and against the
consideration of consequences other than immediate benefit to the
claimant. Accordingly, it is harder to make a rights claim for a
neighborhood's opportunity to control land development within its
borders than against a taking of an individual's property without
compensation. It is harder to make a rights claim for police
protection from private harassment than for freedom from police
harassment. It is harder to make a rights claim for the provision of
unenacted welfare benefits than against rescission of enacted Social
Security benefits. To be sure, there is a tendency to try to expand
rights claims to embrace any interest deemed important by political
liberalism,34 but this course would dilute the rights idea to trivial-
ity. The central rhetorical thrust of the rights theme has always
been to suggest that there is a subcategory of important interests
that merit a special type of commitment from the legal system.
In operation, however, rights rhetoric does not seem to mark out
a set of claims that could plausibly be regarded as more central to
the basic liberal commitments of liberty and equality than the
claims against which this rhetoric is invoked. To be sure, the
rhetoric resonates with the long tradition of constitutionalist
political theory that holds that certain protections of individual
flourishing must be safeguarded against legislative majorities. To
some extent, rights talk implicates the debate within political
liberalism between constitutionalism and legislative supremacy.35
But often this rhetoric is deployed in a stale, dogmatic manner that
33. For an explicitly Pragmatist critique of "international human rights" rhetoric on
grounds similar to those pressed here, see David Kennedy, The International Human Rights
Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 (2002).
34. E.g., Lynd, supra note 17, at 494-95 (arguing in response to the claim that the rights
idea has been inimical to worker interests in collective organizational efficacy that such
interests should also be deemed rights).
35. See generally FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999).
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reflects little more than a desire to protect longstanding visceral
attachments against reexamination.
A series of intellectual rigidities that commonly accompany the
rights theme magnify this impression. These include: a formalist
tendency to assume that legal texts have timeless and essential
meanings that can be derived without reference to their contexts;
a "slippery slope" tendency to assume that the smallest reduction
of an entitlement will cascade into an enormous loss; a Utopian
tendency to ignore the costs of the recognition of entitlements; a
paranoid tendency to portray competing values in terms of the
interests of government and corporate power and wealth; a
sentimental tendency to defend general rules with broad social
consequences in terms of dramatic, emotionally compelling, but not
necessarily typical, stories of individual misfortune; and a self-
righteous tendency to see serious injuries as consequences of
morally blameworthy misconduct. Of course, these tendencies are
not unique to Legal Liberalism. The claim here is simply that,
within Legal Liberalism, they are strongly associated with the
rights theme. The only way to support this claim is through
examples.
1. Community Policing
In an article called When Rights are Wrong, Tracey Meares and
Dan Kahan criticized the Warren Court's criminal procedure
doctrine for impeding efforts by minority communities to organize
in order to enhance neighborhood security.36 In particular, they
focused on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine used to strike down
loitering ordinances and the search-and-seizure doctrine."7 The
American Civil Liberties Union and others used these doctrines
against a series of measures adopted in some of Chicago's crime-
troubled minority neighborhoods. Those measures included the
mass building search for weapons or drugs in housing projects and
a loitering ordinance that gave police discretion to order people
suspected of gang-related activity to disperse.
36. See generally Meares & Kahan, supra note 2. For a different version of the argument,
see Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197.
37. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 2, at 8.
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Against the ACLU interpretation of the Warren Court precedents
that such measures should be categorically invalid, Meares and
Kahan argued that their validity should be assessed contextually in
terms of three factors. The first factor is the extent of support for
the measures in the local communities affected by them. Measures
imposed by a remote and unrepresentative government ought to be
suspect, but measures supported by local institutions deserve
deference. The second factor, "burden sharing," looks at whether the
costs of the measure unfairly accrue to some recognizable group
within the community other than groups defined primarily in terms
of a propensity for illegal activity. If the burdens were fairly
distributed, then that should weigh in favor of acceptance.3" The
third factor, "guided discretion," evaluates the extent to which the
measures are accompanied by processes that structure the discre-
tion they confer and induce accountability for its exercise.39 In
connection with the Chicago loitering ordinances, Meares and
Kahan pointed out that the police department permitted its
enforcement only by designated officers working under specific
guidelines and that enforcement was part of a community policing
strategy in which police worked closely with neighborhood groups.'
As they surely anticipated, the responses to Meares and Kahan's
argument from card-carrying liberals were largely, and sometimes
passionately, negative. Some of the responses challenged the
suggestion that their criteria were satisfied in the Chicago case. In
particular, they questioned whether there was broad and informed
support in the affected minority communities for the measures and
whether the police were exercising their discretion in a structured,
accountable fashion. Several respondents also challenged the
criteria themselves and insisted that the measures in question
should be invalid regardless of whether the three conditions were
satisfied.
For example, Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer argued
that the idea of an affected community was so indeterminate that
it could not be properly defined for the purpose of measuring
approval (a skepticism that would seem to preclude democratic
legitimacy for any legislative act) and that "[o]ur Constitution does
38. See id. at 25-26.
39. See id. at 27-29.
40. See id. at 16.
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.not permit a majority to limit individual rights simply by offering
.to share the burden."4' The "Framers," they concluded, "enacted a
Constitution that guaranteed rights, not to collectivities, but to
individuals."4 2
. Alschuler and Schulhofer at least implied that a unanimous
waiver might be acceptable, although given their skepticism about
legislative boundaries, it would have to be a global one. Carol
Steiker would not go even this far. For her, the rights established
by these forty-year-old Warren Court cases are timeless and
inalienable. She framed the issue as a contest between "indispens-
able freedoms" (not to be subject to police discretion) and "expedient
policy," (the interest in not being victimized by violent crime) and
insisted that the former must "trump" the latter."'
The themes of these critiques--extreme skepticism about
democracy and all forms of nonjudicial collective action, the
selective invocation of tradition, and the conclusory privileging of
interests conventionally defined as individual-are echoed in Alan
Dershowitz's contribution." Dershowitz takes particular exception
to Meares' and Kahan's effort to promote the interest in neighbor-
hood security to the level of a right by the term "group rights,"
dismissing the term as an "oxymoron," and noting ominously that
"[giroups ... have interests and agendas .... "4 "Our traditional
conception of rights," he further insisted, "is directed against
governmental abuses."4 Interests that do not fit within this
conception have to yield because of a "fundamental lesson of history:
that in the long run, abuses by the state are far more dangerous to
liberty and democracy than individual criminal conduct....
41. Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. Ci. LEGALF. 215,240 (ignoring
Meares and Kahan's point that the likelihood of disproportionate burden should determine
whether there is a constitutional right).
42. Id. at 244 (failing to note that the Framers would almost certainly have considered
anti-loitering laws legitimate). See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CREME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISToRY, 103-04 (1993) (indicating that harsh treatment of vagrancy was an
accepted part of the Anglo-American legal tradition until recently).
43. Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong Than Rights, in URGENTTIMES, supra note 2, at 49,55-
57.
44. Alan M. Dershowitz, Rights and Interests, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 2, at 33.
45. Id. at 35.
46. Id. at 36.
47. Id.
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Presumably this "fundamental lesson" does not mean we should
have no state enforcement of the criminal law, but Dershowitz
never explained why it dictates a scope that excludes the Chicago
measures. Meares and Kahan had not ignored the dangers of state
abuse, but rather proposed different checks on them, such as
community and departmental monitoring. Apparently for
Dershowitz, history speaks only through the Warren Court.
Alschuler and Shulhofer, Steiker, and Dershowitz all invoke the
slippery slope argument to suggest that, even if these Chicago
communities had somehow plausibly and legitimately concluded
that it was in their interests to adopt the measures, they should not
be able to do so because their actions would have negative
precedential effects. The premise seems to be that other communi-
ties would be unable to discern the particular features that
distinguished Chicago's situation from their own and thus be
tempted to import the Chicago innovations to inappropriate
environments. The critics do not explain why they think this
difficulty with contextual thinking is so widespread. The suspicion
arises that they are simply projecting the pathologies of their own
rhetorical practices on the population at large.
2. Tort Reform
The American tort system has radical deficiencies that one would
expect liberals to decry." The system provides no benefits at all to
most injured people because, for example, they were injured without
fault or without discovering the fault, their damages are too low to
warrant the cost of bringing a claim, or the injurer is judgment-
proof. The awards the system does make are staggeringly arbitrary,
depending on the actual or anticipated judgments in thousands of
dispersed venues of panels of lay decision makers assembled for a
single case, operating under vague instructions, and without any
knowledge of decisions in other cases. (These are exactly the
conditions that liberal lawyers often mention as making fair
48. My assertions about the tort system rely on ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM: THE AMFRCAN WAY OF LAW 126-44 (2001); STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY
WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND
BusINEss (1989); and Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (2002).
2004]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
decision making about the death penalty impossible.) The system's
effect in deterring bad conduct seems weak, and in some respects,
perverse. Most importantly, the compensation that the system does
provide is accomplished only at a huge expense. Less than fifty
percent of the total payments by defendants go to claimants, and in
some categories, much less. For example, one series of studies found
that, "close to two-thirds of insurance company expenditures in
asbestos suits (including cases settled before trial) ended up in the
pockets of lawyers and experts for both sides rather than in those
of asbestos victims and their families."49
One might expect liberals to favor the replacement of this system
with one that is more inclusive, involves stronger administrative
and less partisan control, and restricts or eliminates juries, such as
that proposed by Stephen Sugarman or the one actually operating
in New Zealand.5 ° To some extent, they do, but many liberal
lawyers seem to have a soft spot for the tort system. Their indul-
gence seems related to the fact that comprehensive reform chal-
lenges the basic commitments of Legal Liberalism to procedural
individuation and partisan control, its populist suspicion of
nonjudicial state actors, and a tendency to regard the benefits that
the current system provides as rights.
Surely these premises play some role in the virtual disappear-
ance of comprehensive tort reform from liberal legal discussion and
political practice in recent years. Instead, both debate and practice
have focused around a small set of incremental reforms, most
proposed by conservatives or businesses, such as caps on non-
economic damages or limits on attorneys' fees. Such ideas address
important problems in the system, but most are poorly designed,
and there are ample grounds for opposing them.5 Much of the
liberal lawyers' discussion of these reforms, however, is striking for
its absence of serious analysis or meaningful alternatives. Much of
it, including virtually all the statements of Ralph Nader and the
trial lawyers' associations, expresses a vehement categorical
49. KAGAN, supra note 48, at 127; see also Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation
Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1819, 1834-37,
1855 n.61 (1992) (calculating that attorneys' fees on a large set of asbestos claims that did not
involve substantial risk or call for exceptional skill averaged $5,000 an hour).
50. See generally SUGARMAN, supra note 48.
51. For discussion and references, see MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATIVES 690-97, 787-92 (7th ed. 2001).
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opposition to any serious alteration of the system.52 Rhetorically,
this rigidity is strongly associated with rights talk.
Currently, doctors in several states maintain there is a malprac-
tice crisis. At least one insurance company has gone under, and
several have cancelled coverage of especially risky practice areas,
such as obstetrics. Rates have soared to the point that some doctors
are abandoning their practices. Even before the crisis, malpractice
insurance rates in the United States were said to be several times
the comparable rates in Canada. The doctors are asking state
legislatures to intervene. Asked for his views on this situation, the
president of the West Virginia Trial Lawyers Association said,
"It]he real crisis that we face is the threat to our system of justice.
They want to take away our fundamental right to seek and obtain
compensation for a wrong.""
The idea that the payoffs flowing from the lottery that our tort
system has become represent fundamental rights has been taken
to heart by several state supreme courts, which have struck down
various attempts at reform. The Supreme Court of Florida, for
example, interpreted a provision of the state constitution providing
no more than that "[tihe courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury" 4 to effectively constitutionalize established
tort law."5 It followed that a $450,000 cap on pain-and-suffering
damages was invalid regardless of the policy justifications for it:
"[W]e are dealing with a constitutional right which may not be
restricted simply because the legislature deems it rational to do
so."5 6 Courts in at least eighteen states have held a variety of tort
reforms to deny several constitutional rights, including rights to
due process, equal protection, and jury trials. 7 The decisions have
52. See RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 256-59 (1996); American Trial Lawyers' Association,
Grassroots Action Center, at http://www.atla.org/ActivitstCenterrier3/ActionNetwork.aspx
(last visited Aug. 6, 2004).
53. Francis X. Clines, Insurance-Squeezed Doctors Fold Their Tents, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2002, at A24; see also Maria Newman, In Mass Trenton Rally, Doctors Protest Malpractice
Insurance Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at B5 (quoting the president of the Association
of Trial Lawyers - New Jersey as saying, "taking people's rights away is not the answer").
54. Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987).
55. Id. at 1087-92.
56. Id. at 1089.
57. See Richard C. Turkington, Constitutional Limitations on Tort Reform: Have the State
Courts Placed Insurmountable Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses to the Perceived
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in common that they are based on formalistic deductions from
vague constitutional language, they more or less explicitly refuse to
consider policy arguments, and they afford a level of protection to
tort plaintiffs' rights that is considerably greater than the same
courts typically give to other private law interests.
Dogmatic conceptions of right played an important role in the
1998 defeat of a congressional response to health claims against
the tobacco companies that would have replaced expensive lawyer-
dominated litigation with administrative tribunals and streamlined
eligibility criteria and procedures. The proposed settlement also
would have strengthened federal regulation over cigarettes and,
at once, increased resources and redirected them away from
individual claim payment toward public health measures.5 After
elaborate negotiations, coalitions of self-interested trial lawyers
and sincere activists under the influence of Legal Liberalism
defeated the proposal. In a detailed account of the negotiations,
Michael Pertschuk concluded that the opposition was mistaken and
reported that some of the opponents, including Ralph Nader, were
having second thoughts.59 No doubt the merits of the settlement
were debatable, but it is troubling that so much of the argument
against it took the form of unreflective rights rhetoric. Opponents
denounced the bill's modest limitation of damage liability as a
violation of individual rights, even though no one could say reliably
what the magnitude of civil liability under existing law was or
which claimants could expect to benefit.' They insisted on the
Liability Insurance Crisis?, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1299, 1317-22 (1987). To be sure, many decisions
have rejected such challenges. Id. at 1303-04.
58. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, SMOKE IN THEIR EYES: LESSONS IN MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP FROM
THE TomAcco WARS 201-10, 242-43 (2001).
59. See id. at 274-79. To date, a similar coalition has thwarted analogous reforms
regarding asbestos. See Lester Brickman, Lawyers' Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the
Brave New World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 243, 246
n.13 (2001).
60. See PERTSCHUK, supra note 58, at 132-33, 217-19. There had been no significant
recoveries in private tobacco cases up to this point, and as the experience with asbestos cases
suggests, smoker interests are poor candidates for elevation as rights even by Legal Liberal
standards. Recovery requires doctrinal innovation on such matters as causation and
assumption of the risk which no one could have anticipated at the time of the defendants'
conduct. It requires factual findings regarding such matters as the plaintiff's exposure to
asbestos or awareness of tobacco toxicity that are not susceptible to reliable determination
in circumstances where the only evidence is often oral testimony that is likely to be distorted
by self-interest. It also necessitates modifications of traditional court procedure to facilitate
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importance of punishing the companies with massive liabil-
ity-though there was little reason to believe such liability would
have any effect on the individual wrongdoers, who were likely to
have retired or sold their stock-or on the practices of the compa-
nies, which would continue to operate after bankruptcy by peddling
their wares for the benefit of the plaintiffs.6
Rights rhetoric on tort reform is strongly reinforced by Populist
themes. There is considerable public sympathy for injured people,
and the typical voter is more likely to find herself in the position
of a tort plaintiff than of a tort defendant. In simple majoritarian
terms, one would expect legislatures to fairly protect plaintiffs'
interests. It is thus an important part of the case against judicial
deference to legislatures that they have been captured by corporate
interests. Ralph Nader, in a book with Wesley Smith, calls tort
reform "the corporate scheme to wreck our justice system."62 After
dismissing reform proposals as "a direct assault on victims" and
"anti-individual rights," Nader and Smith describe at length the
corporate contributors to various lobbying groups and conclude,
"[blehind the various front groups agitating for tort reform in
Washington and state capitals are the usual suspects: America's
richest industrial and insurance companies and their power-lawyer
lieutenants from [the] big firms...." Nader and Smith do have some
policy arguments against the reforms, but their main point seems
to be that the reforms are discredited simply by virtue of their
association with the presumptively greedy striving of big business.
Nader and Smith take no account that one of the major lobbying
and advocacy forces on these issues is the plaintiffs' bar. One would
never know from them that the vanguard of this bar has emerged
in recent decades as a wealthy and highly organized political power.
Nader and Smith include an appendix listing "Itihe Top-Grossing
Law Firms in the United States" and their annual gross revenues,6
apparently intending to awe and disturb us with the large numbers,
but do not mention that most of the highest-paid individual lawyers
mass processing of claims that replicate the stereotypical disadvantages of state
bureaucratization without the compensating advantages of unified, disinterested
administration. See Brickman, supra note 59.
61. PERTSCHUK, supra note 58, at 134-35.
62. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 256.
63. Id. at 259.
64. Id. at 371-76.
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in the United States are tort plaintiffs' lawyers.65 The contributions
of the trial lawyers to President Clinton's first electoral campaign
were among the largest of any industry group. When Clinton vetoed
two liability reform bills in his first term, the vetoes were widely
attributed to their influence.66
B. The Inhibition of Civic Organization
The priority of rights and the commitments to confidentiality and
procedural individuation suggest a view of law as the vindication of
a series of discrete individual entitlements. This view does not rule
out lawyering in connection with civic organization, but it some-
times turns out to be in significant tension with it.
1. Social Policy Design
The rights idea has a bias in favor of certain styles of social policy
that may impede civic organization. Rights can impede organization
by providing a substitute for it. The decline of American unions has
been accompanied by the growth of a panoply of worker protections
in the form of individual rights (for example, unlawful discharge
constraints, anti-discrimination, ERISA, and health care regula-
tion). There is no necessary causal relationship between individual
rights and union decline, but there is a potential one. When society
channels benefits through unions, it raises individual incentives to
join and thus helps unions overcome the free rider problem that
leads many not to join even though they benefit from the union's
activity. For this reason, some nations provide a role for unions in
the administration of social insurance or training benefits. Giving
unions responsibilities for general benefit programs generates
economies of scope with other activities and brings them into
routine contact with workers. Conversely, a state that makes many
benefits available as individual rights may inhibit the union's
65. The fifteen top earners in Forbes's survey of the highest-paid lawyers in 1994 (the year
for which Nader and Smith reported firm incomes) were all plaintiffs' lawyers. On average,
the highest-paid plaintiffs lawyers earned several times as much as the highest-paid
corporate lawyers. Brigid McMenamin, The Best-Paid Lawyers, FORBES, Nov. 6, 1995, at 145-
68.
66. Douglas Frantz, Trial Lawyers, Their Money, and Their Influence Have Become Issues
in the Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996, at A18.
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organizing abilities. If the workers still need the union for some
purposes but find it more difficult to organize, they could be worse
off.67 Effective union action, moreover, may depend upon the union's
ability to compel dissidents to comply with majority decisions and
police free riding by people who get the benefits of collective action
but are disinclined to contribute to them. Strong individual rights,
such as the ability to refuse to abide by strike decisions or to
contribute to union political activity, can impair collective efficacy.'
American housing and welfare policy displays a recurring
competition between mobility policies, such as vouchers that create
portable benefits that the individual recipient can take with her,
and policies that provide benefits to community-based organizations
to make improvements rooted in particular communities. One of the
arguments for the latter is that they are more likely to induce civic
participation that creates social capital and provides a variety of
collective benefits.69 I cannot say that liberal lawyers have been
hostile to the second approach, but their ideological premises make
it difficult for them to explain its potential virtues.
2. Professional Responsibility and Legal Aid
If the idea of right implies a discrete entitlement that an
individual holds "against the world," the corresponding idea of the
lawyer-client relation is a "community of two" in which a profes-
sional champion protects the client from outsiders. v This image, as
67. Tamara Lothian calls the model in which the state delegates to unions the
performance of various social welfare and education functions "corporatist" and argues that,
in comparison with the American alternative, it makes organizing much easier. Tamara
Lothian, The Political Consequences of Labor Law Regimes: The Contractualist and
Corporatist Models Compared, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1008-11, 1017-27 (1986). For an
exploration of the idea that organizational efficacy often requires collective coercion in order
to overcome "free rider" problems, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 66-98 (1965).
68. See David Abraham, IndividualAutonomy and Collective Empowerment in LaborLaw:
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1268 (1988).
69. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW,
BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 49-58 (2001).
70. PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD 52
(1966). This is Riefi's term for the patient-psychotherapist relation. I show that a similar
conception of the lawyer-client relation pervades the law school clinical movement in William
H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487,496-
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expressed in the professional responsibility norms derived from
the premises of confidentiality and procedural individuation,
sometimes creates tensions with efforts to connect lawyering with
civic organization. The tensions are reinforced when this lawyering
image is combined with the Victim Perspective. We can see this in
the recurring anxiety about organizing and organizations in the
movement to provide civil legal aid to the poor.
Lawyers' primary professional commitments are to clients. They
may not make commitments to principles or collectivities that
conflict with the interests of clients, other than the positive law and
certain basic procedural norms. They may not take on clients when
their own commitments are likely to limit their pursuit of the
client's interests.7' They may not put themselves in positions where
third parties can influence their actions on behalf of clients.72
The degree of constraint these principles impose depends on
how they are interpreted. There was a time when they were
interpreted to preclude lawyer participation in most efforts to
combine organizing with individual claim assertion. Traditionally,
in situations where lawyers acquired overlapping responsibilities
to both individual clients and organizations, the bar was quick to
find ethics violations on the basis of speculative conflicts of interest.
The two most important examples are the NAACP's
antidiscrimination campaign and the railroad unions' efforts to
assist trainmen in asserting workers' compensation claims. Lawyers
who took individual cases referred to them by the NAACP and the
unions as part of these organizations' broader political strategies
were disciplined on the ground that they had put themselves in a
position that might require them to sacrifice client interests to
those of the organizations. In neither case was there any evidence
that the lawyers did not serve the clients well, and in both cases the
clients' adversaries prompted the campaigns against the lawyers.
In both cases, the campaigns to stop lawyers from cooperating with
these organizations were halted only by Supreme Court cases
holding that the activities were protected by the First Amend-
ment.73
501 (1980).
71. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBmmI DR 5-105(A) (1981).
72. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFn CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (Proposed Official Draft 2003).
73. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); NAACP v.
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Today the bar's efforts in these episodes are considered transpar-
ently reactionary. Legal Liberalism does not identify with them, but
the anxiety they reflect about the conflict between client and
organizational commitments still has an influence. The idea of the
lawyer-client relation as a fortress for a single desperate individual
seems to have played an important role in the reluctance of legal
aid programs to organize small-case, neighborhood practices
strategically. Gary Bellow, among others, argued for decades that
this is exactly what they should pursue.7" Legal aid resources are
sufficient to serve only a small fraction of the claims that might be
asserted on behalf of the poor. In addition, many of the legal
problems that these individual cases present have a systemic
quality and involve practices of large institutions that affect broad
numbers of people. It thus makes sense for legal services programs
to set priorities and focus their efforts on these systemic problems.
Bellow also suggested that aggregating and coordinating individual
cases might be superior to appellate litigation for addressing many
systemic problems." Appellate litigation is slow, and appellate
rulings often have limited impact because there are insufficient
resources to enforce them. On the other hand, individual case work
can take place at the grassroots level and may be more amenable to
coordination with other forms of civic activism.
Some legal services offices take a strategic approach to service
work, but more resist it. They tend to set very broad parameters
and then take whatever cases people happen to bring to the office.
Some of the pressure to practice this way comes from conservatives
with influence in Washington, who are suspicious of any federally
subsidized lawyering that looks political. Few legal services lawyers
are themselves conservatives, however, and they have their own
reasons for inclining toward a nonstrategic style of service practice.
Under any model, they will turn some people away, albeit uncom-
fortably. Under a focused, strategic model, however, they will turn
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See generally George E. Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case
for BRT, 12 UCLAL. REV. 306 (1965) (discussing the implications ofBRTv. Virginia, 377 U.S.
1 (1964)).
74. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA
BRIEFCASE. 106, 119-22 (1977). For another version of the critique, with citations to the
literature, see Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529
(1995).
75. See Bellow, supra note 74, at 121-22.
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away more people and sooner. Moreover, they are uncomfortable
setting priorities. Emotionally, they see their cases as discrete
representations of individual people. Cognitively, they think of the
job as the enforcement of individual rights.
Making an organization a client can mitigate these inhibitions.
Under the bar's norms, an organizational client is treated more or
less like an individual, and if the organization is committed to
principles that the lawyer regards as valid, the potential for tension
between collective commitments and client loyalty is minimized.
There are, however, at least two limitations to this approach.
First, some legal aid lawyers put such a strong value on repre-
senting individuals that they are reluctant to accept any organiza-
tional representation that might put them in opposition to a poor
person. For example, lawyers in a legal services program with
which I am familiar once opposed representing a community
nonprofit developing subsidized housing because representing the
corporation might preclude them, under conflict-of-interest norms,
from representing tenants in the housing after it was built, for
example, if the corporation sought to evict the tenants. The
corporation was a highly-regarded community-based organization.
No one knew any reason to think it would mistreat its tenants, but
these lawyers would have rather foregone the opportunity to
represent an admired organization than lose the speculative
possibility of representing individuals against it.
Second, disadvantaged groups are less formally organized than
others. This means that if the legal aid lawyer wants to represent
organizations, she will sometimes have to help form them. Efforts
to help people organize will involve the lawyer in jointly represent-
ing individuals. Although such representation is common, the bar's
norms express discomfort with it. They mandate a hypersensitivity
to conflict that can sometimes inhibit or preclude particular efforts
to assist groups that are not formally organized.
The norms on joint representation caution against the danger
thatjointly represented individuals will disclose confidences to each
other and later regret it, or that one of the individuals may end up
getting less in a joint representation than if she were represented
individually. Under the previously dominant rules, a lawyer could
not undertake a joint representation unless it was "obvious" that
the representation would work out well for everyone, a standard
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that, if taken literally, would almost never be satisfied.v6 Even
under the newer, more liberal standard, it is not enough that the
representation appears to be the best course for everyone. If there
is serious uncertainty, doubts are to be resolved against joint
representation.77
If disputes develop, the lawyer may have to cease representation
of any of the individuals. More than likely, she will not be able to
remain with the majority, or with those whose positions she
believes are most consistent with the original project. The concern
is that she will have confidences from each of them that she should
not be able to use to any of the individuals' disadvantage. Even
without confidences, the doctrine sometimes suggests that a sense
of continuing loyalty to each individual precludes continued
representation adverse to a former jointly represented client.
78
To some extent, this solicitude for the individual client is not
waivable, at least prospectively. Suppose ten tenants ask a lawyer
to bring a lawsuit against their landlord for failure to maintain the
premises. They think that by conducting their cases in concert, they
will achieve both cost efficiencies and greater leverage against the
landlord. They also think that the landlord will not be willing to
settle with any of them unless he can settle all the cases. They thus
agree that they will abide by majority rule with respect to strategy
and settlement. If one of them defects from the agreement, may the
lawyer enforce the agreement by following the instructions of the
majority with respect to all the cases? If not, may she at least
continue to represent the majority? Although the answers have
lately become unclear, the traditional answer is no. 79 Loyalty to
individual clients precludes the lawyer from vindicating this kind
of collective commitment, but such loyalty deprives the individuals
of opportunities for effective collective action.
76. MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBLITY DR 5-105(C) (1981).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (Proposed Official Draft 2003).
78. See, e.g., Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979).
79. See, e.g., Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding
such conduct as violative of the attorney-client relationship).
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C. Minimizing Lawyer Accountability to Clients
At the same time that it exalts the individual client and seeks to
protect her from outside forces, Legal Liberalism leaves the client
vulnerable to the lawyer. The principles of confidentiality and
individuation reinforce this vulnerability.
Organized clients generally have the resources and sophistication
to hold their lawyers accountable for their performance, but the
individual client of whom Legal Liberalism is most solicitous does
not. There is substantial indication that lawyers for individual
clients commonly exploit them by overcharging or providing
negligent or knowingly poor service.' ° The reason is not that they
are more or less greedy than others, but that the mechanisms of
accountability are so weak.
The professional responsibility norms that inhibit the lawyer
from establishing relations with both individuals and organizations
with which they are affiliated preclude or constrain some of the
more plausible monitoring relations. Unions and insurance
companies are sometimes in a good position to monitor the quality
of service given to their members or insureds, but the bar has
successfully resisted such efforts on the ground that they would
jeopardize confidentiality and independence of judgment on behalf
of the client. Aside from enjoining confidentiality of client informa-
tion, the bar's norms forbid allowing a third party who pays for
legal services or refers the client to "interfere" or "direct" the
lawyer's conduct."' Although such norms preclude opportunistic
interference, they also preclude benign interference designed to
ensure quality of service."
For decades, the organized bar sought to prohibit group legal
service or legal insurance plans in which lay people had any
80. See generally DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYERAND CLiENr. WHo'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.8, 5.4(c) (Proposed Official Draft 2003).
82. Another minor but revealing norm is the rule that forbids a lawyer from
communicating with a represented adverse party without the advance consent of that party's
lawyer. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.2 (Proposed Official Draft 2003). The rule has
an obvious legitimate function in protecting the adverse party against over-reaching. The rule
often functions, however, to allow a lawyer to prevent his own client from learning about the
lawyer's own incompetence or misconduct from the other side. It is difficult to think of any
legitimate reason for the bar's refusal to permit even written communication to the client with
a copy to the lawyer.
[Vol. 46:127
SOLVING PROBLEMS VS. CLAIMING RIGHTS
executive role or which limited beneficiary choice to a closed panel
of lawyers who had a continuing relationship with the group or
insurer (and hence would be subject to at least indirect
monitoring).' The ABA takes the position that, while boards of
legal aid programs may review the work of staff lawyers, they may
regulate decisions in ongoing cases only through general policies,
not through ad hoc review." Legal aid lawyers often resist any
qualitative evaluation of their work on the ground that it would
interfere with their independent judgment on behalf of the client.
Plaintiffs' lawyers commonly insist that the medical profession is
unaccountable, aside from the malpractice system, for medical
mistakes.85 The nonlitigation monitoring of much of medical
practice, however, is quite rich compared to the monitoring of most
of the practice of plaintiffs' lawyers. American hospitals at least
have peer review procedures that do not depend on patient com-
plaints. There is no comparable monitoring procedure for lawyers.
The disciplinary agencies of the medical licensing authorities may
be lax, but surely no more than the comparable agencies of the bar.
The recent Harvard study of medical mistakes, based on a review
of randomly chosen treatment files at hospitals, would be inconceiv-
able with respect to tort law practice. 86 No one could obtain access
to enough files.
The class action for damages represents another highly unac-
countable representative structure. Here the only plaintiffs likely
to have direct contact with the lawyer commonly have no significant
individual stake, and as a result, no incentive to monitor. Courts
are supposed to watch out for the class, but they have limited
information and have often shown remarkable disinclination to do
so.
8 7
In addition, Legal Liberals' inclination to turn dependent people,
especially children and the mentally disabled, into rights holders
has created more unaccountable representative structures. The
paternalistic practices of juvenile courts and mental health
83. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETIcs 910-17 (1986).
84. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 324 (1970).
85. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 290-95.
86. See generally PAUL C. WElLER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).
87. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995).
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institutions functioned poorly, but they were potentially more
transparent and, to that extent, accountable. The lawyer's insis-
tence on the independence and confidentiality of his relation with
clients makes accountability difficult. In the famous Pennhurst
case, challenging a Pennsylvania institution for the retarded, the
plaintiffs lawyer initially undertook to represent the mother of the
named plaintiff, as guardian of her daughter.' When the mother
objected to his efforts to close, rather than improve, the institution,
he indicated that he would take instruction only from the daughter,
who was by then an adult, but whose ability to make the relevant
decisions was doubtful.89
Finally, the liberal legal idea of rights as something to be argued
and derived analytically may encourage lawyers to limit client
participation. When Derrick Bell questioned whether the NAACP's
school desegregation strategy was responsive to the views of
members of the client classes, the NAACP's General Counsel
Nathaniel Jones replied: "The responsibility I, as chief litigation
officer of the NAACP have, is to insure that each plan the NAACP
submits to a court ... must square with the legal standards pro-
nounced by the Supreme Court as necessary to effectively vindicate
constitutional rights, and bring into being a unitary system."90
D. Diseconomies of Information
Observers find the American judicial system vastly more
expensive than those of the nations to which we usually compare
ourselves. Some concede that it has the advantage of accommodat-
ing certain large-scale challenges to corporate and government
abuse that could not be brought in other systems, but, at the same
time, large cases have a potential for waste and opportunism that
would not be tolerated in our peer systems.9' If one turns to the
medium and small cases that constitute the bulk of the courts'
business, the comparisons seem almost entirely to the disadvantage
88. Robert A. Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY,
LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLIcY 265 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
89. Id. at 281-89.
90. Bell, supra note 1, at 492 n.64.
91. See KAGAN, supra note 48, at 135-38.
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of the American system. Our system is more costly, more unpleas-
ant for litigants and witnesses, and more uncertain than others.
The conclusion that the American system functions poorly is
reinforced by the tendency of parties in contractual relations to opt
out of the court system by agreeing to private arbitration. To be
sure, many of these contracts are contracts of adhesion where the
stronger party uses its contracting power to shunt the other into a
more favorable process. Even in contracts between parties of
comparable resources and sophistication, however, there is a
tendency to agree to arbitration. Since these are the cases where
the judicial system is least prone to problems of opportunism, the
tendency to opt out seems quite damning.
The most salient explanation for the excessive cost, unpleasant-
ness, and uncertainty of the judicial system arises from the extreme
degree of partisan control, and perhaps also, its unique reliance on
the jury in civil cases. These points are quite harmful to Legal
Liberalism, since its commitment to confidentiality and information
control gives it a strong affinity for partisan control and its
Populism inclines it to embrace the jury. There are, however, two
more specific problems that arise under Legal Liberalism's operat-
ing premises. Each involves inefficiency in the production and use
of information, and hence, in the possibilities for learning.
1. Disincentives for Producing Information
First, the operating premises of Legal Liberalism create very
large demands for information at the same time they make it
expensive to obtain. Procedural individuation and the commitment
to standards when beneficial to the disadvantaged makes for a very
broad range of relevance. The Legal Liberal ideal is the exploration
of all the dimensions of the disputed situation, at least all those
which a disadvantaged litigant deems relevant. Respect and dignity
are equated in part with the fullness and particularity of consider-
ation.
The system, however, makes information difficult to obtain.
There are strong confidentiality norms, and there is a discovery
process with limited disclosure duties controlled by partisans.
Moreover, the nature of the American adversary trial-its combina-
tion of compression and adversary control-has unfortunate effects
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on the production of information. If people trust a trial system to
produce just results, they have incentives to preserve evidence of
their conduct so long as they are law-abiding. When someone
destroys evidence without an apparent good reason, or fails to
create evidence when she would do so in the normal course, a
presumption that she is trying to hide something is warranted.92 On
the other hand, if the trial system cannot be trusted, then law-
abiding people may rationally fear that evidence of their conduct
will be misused to establish liability against them. If this fear is
widely recognized, no presumption can be warranted. In a com-
pressed, party-dominated trial proceeding, people may fear that
evidence of legitimate conduct, when taken out of context, will be
used to support liability. If the dangers are widely recognized,
people will cease to regard a failure to document or document
destruction as a sign of wrong-doing, and this will remove a major
disincentive to these practices.
In fact, growing distrust of the courts seems to have produced a
marked tendency in recent decades to minimize documentation.
Traditionally, the basic norm among law-abiding businesses was to
retain documents as long as any dispute about the relevant event
or transaction might arise, say, for the duration of the relevant
statute of limitations. In recent years, however, there has been a
tendency toward a much more restrictive norm: discard everything
immediately unless it will clearly be supportive if a dispute should
arise. In addition to advising such policies, attorneys have often
counseled clients to refrain from taking notes or memorializing
meetings and conversations. Presumably, they believe they can
avoid adverse inferences from such practices because juries and
officials will recognize that their fear of misuse of such information
by the judicial system is reasonable, or at least, genuine.93 At the
92. WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 2524.
93. Such advice was an issue in the prosecution of Arthur Andersen for Enron-related
obstruction of justice. Andersen conceded that it had a general practice of destroying
documents to prevent their use by plaintiffs' lawyers. The prosecution argued that this
suggested consciousness of guilt. Andersen claimed it reflected a fear that the documents
would be misused out of context to create false inferences. It appears that the verdict against
Andersen was not based on its general destruction policy, but rather on the alteration of a
retained document, so the jury may have accepted Andersen's rationale. Jonathan Weil &
Alexei Barrionuevo, Duncan Says Fear of Lawsuits Drove Shredding, WALL ST. J., May 15,
2002, at Cl; Jonathan Weil et al., Auditor's Ruling: Andersen Win Lifts U.S. Enron Case,
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same time, some businesses have channeled discussion of sensitive
issues through privileged communications with lawyers.94 Such
practices, of course, reduce the availability of information, and
increase uncertainty when disputes arise.
The liberal legal commitment to rights sometimes interacts with
confidentiality norms in a perverse way. The categorical view of
rights demands that claims be enforced uncompromisingly when
made. Making claims requires information, however, and rights to
information under Legal Liberalism tend to be weak, in part
because of the commitment to confidentiality. This leads defendants
to assert confidentiality norms to resist disclosure of information in
ways that would be socially valuable, but costly in terms of liability.
For example, recent studies suggest that medical mistakes occur
in hospitals at a much greater rate than previously thought, but
only one out of seven results in a medical malpractice case.9' It
would be highly desirable for hospitals to disclose data either
publicly or to industry organizations in order to assist in self-
correction, systems improvement, and regulation. To do so,
however, would risk an explosion of malpractice claims. The
hospitals insist plausibly that a disclosure regime should involve
either assurance that disclosure could not be used for liability
purposes or broad malpractice reform with a scaling down of
awards. Recent efforts to negotiate such a regime have been
scuttled, in substantial part because the trial lawyers vehemently
opposed both conditions.9
The preoccupation with confidentiality reinforces the inhibition
of civic organization by impeding non-judicial investigation and
consideration of problems. Members of the lay commission ap-
pointed by the Catholic Church to make recommendations about
problems of sexual abuse by priests recently complained that some
bishops were refusing to provide them with needed information.
WALL ST. J., June 17, 2002, at Al.
94. For an egregious example, see the account of the cigarette industrys efforts to conceal
evidence of the toxicity of their product by putting lawyers in charge of research activities in
STANTON A. GLANrz ETAL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 25-46 (1996).
95. WELER, supra note 86, at 138.
96. See Sarah Glazer, Medical Mistakes: Should Reports of Medical Errors Be Made
Public?, THE CQ RESEARCHER, Feb. 25, 2000, at 137-60. There is some irony in the trial
lawyers' position, given the parallel between the hospitals' argument for confidentiality of
error reporting and the bar's argument for attorney-client privilege.
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They attributed this recalcitrance to the influence of lawyers
preoccupied with the possibility that cooperation would make
information more accessible to prosecutors and plaintiffs' lawyers.
Following his resignation, the former chair, Frank Keating,
asserted that the noncooperating bishops "turned to their lawyers
when they should have looked into their hearts."97 Another member
complained that, while the larger Catholic community believes that
"transparency" on the issues is critical, "[tihe attorneys for a diocese
do not think that way.""8
2. Lack of Coordination of Dispute Resolution and Regulatory
Effects
Although a good legal system functions both to resolve disputes
and to regulate conduct generally, the design of the American
judicial system minimizes its regulatory value. Clearly, the prospect
of liability has an influence on conduct, but the influence is crude,
imprecise, and occasionally perverse. Some dangerous products
have been taken off the market as a result of lawsuits, and
corporate executives are more careful to disclose business informa-
tion for fear of liability. On the other hand, some useful products
have been removed from the market for fear of mistaken imposition
of liability and employers do not provide candid evaluations of
former employees to prospective new employers for fear of having
to defend themselves in defamation suits." On balance, the striking
failure of this system is the weakness of its regulatory effects.
Most cases are settled without any liability findings. A settlement
has no formal precedential value, and its terms are not necessarily
reported at all. Even if they are reported, the basis of the settlement
will be unclear, and no liability will have been established. Settled
cases thus have limited value either in clarifying the law or
generating information that might be useful to either private actors
or governments. Unfortunately, cases have to be settled because it
97. Frank Keating, Finding Hope in my Faith, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at A25.
98. Laurie Goodstein, The Lessons of a Year, N.Y. Tms, June 18, 2003, at Al (quoting
board member Jane Chiles).
99. See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort
Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167,2170-76 (2000).
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is so expensive to try them. Moreover, even cases that are adjudi-
cated often yield little or no useful information for regulatory
purposes. The jury as fact finder is notoriously a black box that
usually returns only general verdicts and never explains their
conclusions.
In the welfare system, the administrative adjudicatory system
has been more or less consciously designed to have no impact on the
parallel administrative system of initial claims determination and
case maintenance. When Congress and later the courts pushed
welfare programs to develop hearings systems with independent,
legally-trained decision makers, opportunities for oral presenta-
tions, and written decisions with reasons based on the evidence, the
programs responded. In most welfare programs, a claimant who
files a grievance is likely to get a respectful, procedurally elaborate
hearing, and in fact, claimants have tended to win these hearings
with significant frequency.
The problem is that adjudicatory decisions have no influence on
the cases that claimants do not appeal into the system. In the public
assistance programs, the appeal rates are tiny. There has been
ample reason to believe that significant numbers of these
unappealed decisions would have been reversed if they had been
appealed. Often, failure to appeal seems to have been due to
ignorance. In effect, these programs operate two parallel systems:
a high-quality respectful process and a low-quality impersonal one.
The two were quite consciously separated by bureaucratic walls,
separate personnel, and specific instructions that administrative
workers were to disregard adjudicatory decisions. The situation
seems unsatisfactory on both equity and efficiency grounds.
Similarly situated claimants are treated differently depending on
whether they manage to escape the bureaucratic sphere. At some
times, for example, medical conditions routinely deemed by Social
Security line administrators insufficient to establish disability have
been commonly found disabling by the system's administrative law
judges. Welfare hearing officials have applied an estoppel doctrine
to excuse eligibility conditions, such as procurement of documenta-
tion within specified deadlines, where the administrators failed to
provide necessary information or assistance, but no such relief is
available to the great majority of denied claimants who do not make
it into the hearing system. The relatively rich information gener-
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ated in the adjudicatory sphere is not used to improve performance
in the administrative one.1
To some extent, this may suggest a problem of misimplementa-
tion, rather than a basic defect of Legal Liberalism. There may be,
nevertheless, a more fundamental problem. A response to such
problems would need to involve some attenuation of the distinction
between administration and adjudication. This would improve the
quality of administrative decisions, but it might require attenuating
the principles of individuation and party control of information in
the adjudicatory sphere. One suspects that some liberal lawyers
may have preferred to sacrifice the administrative sphere in order
to maintain the purity of their vision in the adjudicatory one.
E. Rules and Standard Pathologies
Rules and standards each have disadvantages. The rigidity of
rules means that they sometimes compel decisions that are contrary
to their underlying purposes. The need to restrict the discretion of
the relevant actor requires that she sometimes be forced to make a
decision that the legislator would not want a more trusted decision
maker to make, but the same rigidity of rules can also expand the
discretion of the decision maker. She can pursue goals that the
legislator has tried to forbid if she can figure out a way to do so that
was not anticipated in the rule's specific terms. Disclosure rules in
both the criminal and consumer contexts exemplify both disadvan-
tages. Under the Miranda decision and the Truth in Lending Act,
certain disclosures have to be made, and the failure to make them,
even if harmless, can lead to substantial penalties. On the other
hand, if the disclosures are made, compliance is established even if
they have not been understood.
With respect to standards, a major problem is the tendency for
decisions to become a series of ad hoc determinations with no
discernible consistency or principled basis. The one area where
liberals have emphasized this problem is the death penalty. In this
area, they have condemned decisions under such open-ended norms
100. See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92
YALE L.J. 1198, 1246-54 (1983). This article and the literature cited in it concerns Social
Security and the main public assistance programs (e.g., AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps). For
a comparable account of workers' compensation, see NONET, supra note 19.
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as "outrageously and wantonly vile" and as inevitably arbitrary. 1
Others plausibly complain, however, that decisions under a variety
of norms that liberals tend to favor, such as "just cause" for
employment termination or eviction, "unreasonable" for malpractice
or product safety, and "informed consent" for medical treatment,
have the same problem.
1 2
The problems of rules and standards are not unique to Legal
Liberalism, but they are exacerbated by institutional assumptions
that follow from its commitments to Populism and procedural
individuation. These assumptions are distrust of the street level
public workforce on the one hand and the exaltation of the jury on
the other. Distrust of the lower-tier public workforce inclines Legal
Liberalism toward rules, but because the rule maker never has
enough time or information to anticipate every contingency, or to
monitor compliance, the worker retains substantial discretion.
Moreover, the rigidity of the rules and the distrust on which they
are premised may alienate the worker and exacerbate her inclina-
tion either to slack or to find ways around the rules. A common
response is to try to make the rules more specific. Here we have the
danger of a vicious circle, in which each effort to tighten the rules
merely worsens the actors' alienation and resistance, and hence the
need for more specification. Such cycles have been played out quite
explicitly in the less successful "public law litigation" efforts in
which courts have used command-and-control injunctive regulation
to try to reform schools, mental health institutions, and prisons.
1°3
The contrasting pathology of standards reaches an extreme with
the "black box" decision maker of the jury. Juries do not explain
their decisions and are not aware of the decisions in analogous
situations made by otherjuries. Thus, there is no way in which such
decisions can be made consistent. In both cases, mitigation of the
problem requires a culture of collaborative learning. Rules can work
when those subject to them have some disposition toward voluntary
101. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
102. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 99, at 11-12, 41-44, 50-51, 157-58 (arguing that jury
negligence determinations are arbitrary).
103. See, e.g., ARTHUR E. WISE, LEGISLATED LEARNING: THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE
AMERICAN CLASSROOM (1979). I don't suggest that top-down, rule-based regulation is always
unsuccessful, merely that it has strong vulnerabilities. For a more sanguine view, see
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE:
How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998).
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compliance and can be enlisted to provide information needed to
update them. In the private sector, the modern manufacturing
methods pioneered by the Japanese auto industry exemplify this
possibility. '"
Standards can be consistently applied when the decision makers
have a common understanding of their underlying purposes and an
ability to take account of the decisions made by each other. Decision
making by judges is an example. In principle, at any given level,
judicial decisions are coordinated in part by the common profes-
sional orientation of judges and their commitment to treat the
decisions of their peers as persuasive authority. Hierarchical
supervision by superior courts plays a role, but it is too limited to do
the job alone. Something like such horizontal coordination actually
may function with respect to appellate doctrine and even among the
federal trial courts with respect to high profile legal issues. Most
trial court decisions are not reported, however, and on most issues,
trial judges have relatively limited knowledge of what peer courts
decide. Further, appellate courts make little effort to review
findings of fact in order to reconcile disparities.
Some efforts to achieve consistency are made with trial court
decision making. For example, tort reformers have proposed that
guidelines based on past awards for various categories of cases be
formulated and updated. The guidelines would be presented to the
trier of fact, who would have to justify an award outside them with
specific findings. 105
Legal Liberalism does not preclude such efforts, but they are in
some tension with its commitments to Populism and procedural
individuation. Populist distrust of the lower-tier public workforce
engenders skepticism about creating a culture of voluntary
initiative among public workers. Populist infatuation with the jury
discourages taking issues away from it. Some Legal Liberals might
oppose efforts to constrain jury discretion through guidelines as an
undue limitation on their authority. Regardless of the decision
104. On Japanese manufacturing, see Paul S. Adler, Time-and-Motion Regained, HARv.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 97-108.
105. James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 177-88 (1991).
[Vol. 46:127
SOLVING PROBLEMS VS. CLAIMING RIGHTS
maker, some would oppose such guidelines as a violation of the
principle of procedural individuation."0 6
III. LEGAL PRAGMATISM
This section elaborates the premises of the body of convergent
projects I call Legal Pragmatism. At the risk of overemphasizing the
contrast, I have formulated and organized the premises so as to
emphasize their differences with Legal Liberalism.
It is debatable whether the Legal Pragmatist perspective is best
seen as a competitor to the Legal Liberalism that addresses the
whole field of lawyering, or rather as a complement that purports
to be more appropriate to a range of situations but that concedes a
significant range to the Legal Liberal approach. No doubt, the
attitudes and strategies of Legal Pragmatism are more plausible in
some situations than others. On the other hand, the Pragmatists
seem reluctant to specify limits to the applicability of their ap-
proach, and they tend to be ambitious. In the current state of the
discussion, therefore, it seems necessary to defer the question of
scope.
A. Background Premises
The basic background premises of Legal Pragmatism are the
Citizen Perspective, Associative Democracy, and the Priority of
Solutions.
1. The Citizen Perspective
Pragmatism is oriented toward citizens. Victimhood connotes
weakness, passivity, and self-absorption. Citizenship connotes
interest in and capacity for active participation in decision making
and at least moderate sensitivity to public values.
Much of the difference between the citizen perspective and the
victim perspective of Legal Liberalism is rhetorical. To some extent,
the objection to the Victim Perspective is that it lends itself to
106. See NONET, supra note 19, at 212-14 (stating that development of "judicial ethos" in
California Industrial Accident Commission impedes supervision of claims referees who insist
they should decide cases "in accordance with our conscience").
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sentimentality and patronization, but the difference may go deeper
than that. The category of people likely to benefit from the modes
of intervention favored by Legal Pragmatism does not coincide with
the category most likely to benefit from the interventions favored by
Legal Liberalism. In particular, Pragmatist initiatives are likely to
bypass the most desperate and the most deviant. Pragmatism
supposes a measure of mutual accountability and engagement that
may not be attractive to or possible for everyone.
An intentionally provocative illustration of the difference in
perspective is reported by Paul Grogan and Tony Proscio in a book
on Pragmatist-style social programs that support local economic
development. These programs emphasize an unsentimental
approach to screening applicants for housing or credit assistance
and unhesitatingly reject people with criminal records or bad credit
histories:
"You mean you turn people away?" one foundation executive
asked incredulously.
"You bet we do," replied Genny Brooks, the founder of the
Mid-Bronx Desperadoes, which played so central a role in saving
the South Bronx. "We're doing enough, turning this neighbor-
hood around. Don't ask us to take people who won't contribute."
The executive persisted: "But what happens to them?"
Brooks's reply: "I don't care. '
No doubt most Pragmatists would dissociate themselves from the
vehemence of this repudiation of the Victim Perspective. A more
tactful response would have been, "There are other types of
programs for them." The drug courts, considered infra Part IV.A.,
are an example of a Pragmatist-style program oriented to a
particularly desperate group, although even programs like these are
more selective than many others. For example, addicts charged with
violent crimes are ineligible. More importantly, the drug courts
treat their subjects in a highly regimented manner. In return for
the possibility of more lenient punishment, as well as treatment,
they must submit, at least in the short-term, to a regime of
107. PAUL S. GREGORY & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIEs: A BLUEPRINT FOR URBAN
NEIGHBORHOOD SURVIVAL 169 (2000).
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infantilizing control and pervasive surveillance. It seems likely that
some would prefer harsher but less intrusive punishment. °8
Moreover, while the kind of participatory engagement that the
Citizen Perspective connotes is fulfilling for many, it may be a
burden for some. Beyond the requirements of time, the need to
articulate your views to strangers and to do so in the form of
publicly acceptable reasons may be oppressive and alienating.0 9
2. Associative Democracy
Associative Democracy is the idea that citizens should participate
in the design and implementation of the policies that affect them."0
This participation can take a variety of forms, but there is a special
emphasis on participation through nongovernmental organizations.
Associative Democracy counts on the countervailing power of such
organizations to protect against the abuses of governmental and
corporate power emphasized by Populism, rather than relying
primarily on spontaneous unorganized citizen action, as in tradi-
tional Populism, or a virtuous judiciary, as in Legal Liberalism.
Associative Democracy looks in part to the state to foster the
conditions of widespread civic association. The state should provide
support for associations, subject to conditions of openness and
accountability, and should open up access in the policy formulation
and implementation process for them. If the Populist asks why the
state could be expected to support civic associations, rather than
crush or co-opt them in the interests of its own power, the Pragma-
tist has two answers. The first is that state actors are less rapa-
ciously selfish and more public-spirited than the Populist assumes.
The second is that there are potential gains from such a practice for
nearly everyone.
108. On drug courts, see infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
109. This was the experience of some members of the self-governing workplace studied by
Jane Mansbridge. See JANE J. MANSmRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 270-76 (1984).
For the suggestion that the more ambitious forms of participatory politics may be unappealing
or disadvantageous to minorities, see Derrick Bell & Preeta Bonsal, The Republican Revival
and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1610-21 (1988).
110. See CARMEN SIRIANNI & LEWIS FRIEDLAND, CIVIC INNOVATION IN AMERICA23-29 (2001);
Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, in
ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 7 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1995); Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 543-49 (2000).
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Associations can facilitate a more decentralized and flexible mode
of policy implementation. They can transmit better information
about citizen preferences. They can better induce voluntary
cooperation in implementation. In facilitating participation, they
induce a type of education and acculturation that potentially
creates support for the policies.
For example, standard setting in work safety and pollution
control requires local knowledge of changing effects and prefer-
ences. Standard enforcement requires continuous monitoring of
local practice. Associations seem well adapted to respond to both
needs. Thus, work safety regulation in many European countries is
considered more effective than in America, in part because the
European countries give a major role to unions in both standard-
setting and enforcement."1 Also, the Legal Pragmatists have shown
that grassroots associational activity has played a major role in
some of the most promising recent developments in American
environmental policy, such as habitat conservation and toxics
monitoring."2
In appealing to the idea of Associative Democracy, Legal
Pragmatism resonates with a major turn in American public policy
in recent decades. In a variety of programs at all levels of govern-
ment, there has been a trend to incorporate citizen participation
and to provide conditional support for interested voluntary associa-
tions. The opportunities for associational participation in regulatory
rulemaking have been codified and expanded through measures
such as the Negotiated Rulemaking Act."3 Associations play a more
direct role in formulating industry standards for such matters as
safety and product quality that acquire legal force through incorpo-
ration by legislatures, courts, or agencies. A growing range of public
services, from health care to housing, are subcontracted by govern-
ment to private organizations, many of them nonprofits with
111. STEVEN KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY 13-14, 200-03 (1981).
112. See Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 316-22 (explaining use of Toxic Release Inventory
data by private citizens and organizations as a tool for informal environmental regulation).
See generally Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND BACKYARD
ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (Charles Sabel et al. eds., 2000); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adoptive
Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism,
87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Adoptive Ecosystem Management).
113. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2000).
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participatory membership structures. Entrepreneurial community-
based organizations developing housing, employment, or business
opportunities for low-income people have filled some of the space
emptied by the contraction of traditional welfare programs." 4
The Pragmatist literature nevertheless suggests caution about
some of these efforts. Associations have the advantages, in compari-
son to government, of being closer to their members and more
flexible in organization. They have the disadvantages that they are
less inclusive and less broadly accountable. Thus, the Pragmatist
view does not simply contemplate delegation or devolution. It is not
a vision of private voluntarism. Without government intervention,
private associations will not necessarily focus on the issues of most
pressing public importance, will not be accessible or accountable to
many affected constituencies, and will not form at all or will be
relatively weak in disadvantaged areas. Thus, Associative Democ-
racy entails strong central government institutions that focus
efforts on key issues, provide technical and financial support for
associational efforts to deal with them, and assess and enforce
organizational openness and accountability.
If Associative Democracy is not voluntarism, neither is it
corporatism. Corporatism is a system in which government uses its
support and regulation of private associations to dominate them as
instruments of policy dictated by state officials.1 5 The Pragmatist
goal is to achieve support and accountability, while preserving
associational independence.
3. The Priority of Solutions
Pragmatist practice is problem solving. A legal claim is a
suggestion of a problem that calls for a public solution. From the
Pragmatist point of view, the most important difference between
solutions and rights is that solutions to public problems cannot be
derived analytically. They are best derived deliberatively and
experimentally. The Pragmatist objects to the liberal idea of rights
enforcement as the elaboration of a pre-existing moral consensus.
She sides with the Legal Realist in insisting that whatever
114. SIMON, supra note 69, at 7-40; Freeman, supra note 110, at 551-56.
115. See Lothian, supra note 67, at 1008-11.
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normative consensus exists in the society is too incomplete and
ambiguous to play the role Legal Liberalism expects.
Whether the Fourth Amendment precludes sweeps of troubled
housing projects, whether the right to property or equal treatment
requires a fault-based tort system, whether the Equal Protection
Clause entails maximum feasible racial balancing--questions like
these cannot be answered plausibly solely through textual interpre-
tation or the abstract analysis of principle. Our best judgments
about them depend on a range of knowledge that is not derived from
the texts in question and does not take the form of principle. These
judgments are in substantial part instrumental and strategic; they
depend on assumptions about the likely consequences of particular
decisions. Thus, the judgments are most plausibly provisional,
revisable in the light of later experience. To the extent that problem
solving connotes a joint exploration of uncertainty, the term
encourages the parties to be candid about the limitations of their
understanding." 6
The rhetoric of problems and solutions suggests common
interests, rather than the notion connoted by the idea of rights of
individual interests competing with group interests. Problem
solving connotes the possibility of mutually beneficial outcomes. It
treats issues as neither purely distributive nor involving categorical
choices between mutually exclusive positions.
This perspective seems more potent in some situations than
others. It seems more potent, for example, in connection with school
desegregation and tort reform than rent control and abortion. Even
with respect to intensely distributive issues such as rent control,
some options in the range of possible interpretations and implemen-
tations produce higher benefits or lower costs to all parties than
others. Even with respect to highly divisive issues like abortion, the
competing positions are often indeterminate with respect to specific
issues of elaboration or implementation-for example, if the mother
has presumptive autonomy, how far into the pregnancy it extends;
or if there is no presumptive autonomy, whether abortion should
nevertheless be allowed to save her life.
116. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminancy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 875, 935-54 (2003) (describing the rule of experimentalist judging in problem solving
courts).
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The Pragmatist does not ignore conflicting interests or value
dissensus. She merely assumes, first, that any given set of issues is
likely to involve shared as well as conflicting interests and values,
and second, that it is often a mistake to try to determine in advance
of the dispute resolution process which type of values and interests
predominate. If the process is properly designed, neither the
individual nor the community can know what their interests are
before entering it. Each party's conception of her own goals may
change in the course of the process because each may learn things
in the process about the possibilities for realizing them.
Thus, Pragmatism declines to single out a particular category of
interests as categorical or trump-like. It doesn't deny that there are
interests whose value is infinite or that certain types of rationales
are inadmissible. It does suggest that these categories are smaller
than Legal Liberalism tends to suppose and that the attempt to
wall them off in advance of discussion will rarely be useful.
The distinction should not be exaggerated. Every discussion
needs starting points. Every negotiation presupposes a set of
endowments and assumptions about what will happen in the
absence of agreement. The distinctive tendency of Pragmatism is to
insist, as a descriptive matter, that these starting points are usually
indeterminate, and as a normative one, that people should regard
them as provisional.
The Pragmatist conception of problem solving connotes a less
bounded activity than rights enforcement. A right connotes a claim
for an individual benefit, and rights enforcement connotes finality.
Liberal lawyering is a series of discrete self-contained cases."' By
contrast, in Pragmatism problems can ramify broadly, and problem
solving is a continuous activity. Every resolution is provisional and
incorporates assumptions about its evolution and potential
transformation.
Thus, a problem can have a range of dimensions. It could be a
demand for compensation for a particular injury or it could be a
challenge to an established processing for compensating such
injuries. Pragmatism blurs the distinction between moves within a
117. Many liberal lawyers do not, in fact, think of their work in this way. They think of
their cases as having a cumulative significance in terms of over-arching projects. But this is
just one of several ways in which their ideological premises are inconsistent with their more
fundamental self-conception.
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framework and challenges to frameworks. An ostensibly routine
complaint is a possible source of information and initiative that may
suggest broader revisions. The dimensions of the problem may
change in the course of discussion.
The courts are less central in this view. In the first place,
assumptions about what institutions are good for have to be tested
by experience, not incanted as dogma from eighteenth century
political theory. The American judiciary appears to be doing a very
poor job of enforcing a broad range of rights. In the second place,
problem solving usually requires collaboration among different
kinds of institutions.
Finally, Legal Pragmatism is inclined to focus on future collective
benefit rather than compensation for past wrongdoing. It empha-
sizes the high cost of pursuing corrective justice through the legal
system. Proving and punishing wrongdoing is costly both because
it requires difficult factual inquiries about the connection between
past conduct and current injury and because it polarizes the parties
and encourages procedural conflict. Judicial decisions about rights
are increasingly controversial and often fail to alleviate feelings of
injustice, or may aggravate them. The distinction between people
who suffer injuries from past wrongdoing and those who suffer from
similar conditions but cannot trace them to specific wrongdoing
seems arbitrary in many contexts.
As an example of the Legal Pragmatist emphasis on solutions,
consider a proposal by Archon Fung, Dara O'Rourke, and Charles
Sabel for the human rights problem of international labor stan-
dards."' They propose a system of auditing conducted by
nongovernmental organizations in accordance with agreed perfor-
mance measures. The results, as well as the basis of the audit,
would be publicly reported.1 9 Firms with similar products could be
compared within and across nations. The more successful firms
could be rewarded in various ways, such as procurement prefer-
ences by public and nongovernmental organizations, consumer
goodwill, or good public relations. The less successful would be
penalized through analogous mechanisms. For them, the key point
is that standards could be expected to ratchet upward, as the
118. See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN SWEATSHOPS BE STOPPED? (2001).
119. Id. at 4-5.
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frontrunner firms demonstrated possibilities of better
performance."12
They favor this approach over a more conventional one that
would set universal minimum conditions and impose a single set of
powerful sanctions against violators. They object that there is no
way to derive such conditions analytically and that no institution
could acquire enough information to formulate such criteria
effectively. They argue that compliance should not be prescribed in
general categorical terms. Different expectations should be applied
to countries in different circumstances, and standards should be
revised quickly as new learning becomes available. Their approach
is only indirectly punitive. It tries to acknowledge and harness the
common interests of firms and workers in technological advance
that makes better working conditions and productivity possible.
B. Operating Premises
The core operating premises of Legal Pragmatism are stake-
holder negotiation, transparency, and rolling rule regimes.
1. Stakeholder Negotiation
Ideally, problems are solved by negotiation among the people and
groups interested in them. Effective negotiation involves central
public institutions supporting and channeling a decentralized
deliberative process. 2'
a. Deliberation
Deliberation connotes openness and reason giving. Openness
means both a commitment to volunteer relevant information and a
willingness to consider opposing positions. Reason giving means an
effort to explain and discuss one's position in terms of general or
120. Id. at 27-29. -
121. See Archon Fung, AccountableAutonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago
Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & Soc'Y 73, 74-76 (2001); Archon Fung & Eric Olin Wright,
Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & SOC'Y
5, 21 (2001).
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public values. '22 The effects of limiting this condition will depend on
the circumstances. In many contexts, such as small informal groups
of people accustomed to speaking in this manner, it should not
exclude first person narratives or discussions of feelings. What the
reason giving condition most commonly constrains is bargaining
based on threats or claims about the relative power of the parties
to inflict injury on each other.' The main objection to such
bargaining is that it impedes the search for mutually beneficial
solutions.
The goal of negotiation is consensus, or voluntary agreement by
all stakeholders on the basis of a shared normative understand-
ing.124 It would, of course, be naive to think that such a goal can be
routinely, or even often, attained, and Pragmatists are usually
ready to settle for much less. The consensus ideal, however, plays
an important heuristic role. Striving for consensus, even when
unsuccessful, expresses respect for all stakeholders and puts
pressure on the parties to try to understand each other and search
for mutually beneficial solutions.
Of course, negotiation necessarily takes place against a back-
ground in which participants have selfish interests and assump-
tions about their distributive entitlements. The Pragmatist,
however, relies on bootstrapping-the bracketing of self-interest
and distributive claims-in order to focus attention on common
interests and values.2 ' The bootstrapping idea is that, once
participants start to search for mutually beneficial solutions, both
their conceptions of the problems and the range of plausible
responses are likely to change. As this happens, the boundaries of
self-interest and the distinction between distributive claims and
policy responses are likely to blur. As long as there is any possibility
of significant, mutually beneficial exchange, people cannot be sure
what their interests are. If they cannot be sure what their interests
are, they cannot be sure whether and to what extent it is in their
interests to assert their rights. Once they start, the more daring the
122. See FUNG ETAL., supra note 118, at 78-80.
123. See Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to Robert's Rules of Order for Groups,
Organizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 3, 27 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
124. Id. at 6-7.
125. See Charles F. Sabel, Bootstrapping Reform: Rebuilding Firms, the Welfare State, and
Unions, 23 POL. & SOc'i 5, 7 (1995).
[Vol. 46:127
SOLVING PROBLEMS VS. CLAIMING RIGHTS
solutions considered, the less clear it will be how they map onto the
selfish interests of the parties. To the extent that this mapping is
impeded, the parties find themselves forced into a kind of "original
position" in which they have to decide on the basis of the common
interests because they cannot figure out what their individual
interests are.
126
Consider, for example, the positions of public defenders and
treatment providers deliberating about a drug court regime." The
public defenders may fear that they will lose prominence once
treatment becomes the focus of the process. The treatment provid-
ers may anticipate greater prominence. But the new regime
subjects the treatment providers to new mechanisms of accountabil-
ity that may reduce their autonomy and result in reduced rewards
for the less effective ones. The new accountability procedures may
create new roles for the lawyers. It is hard to be selfish when you
cannot figure out what your position will be.
Bootstrapping is the Legal Pragmatist's substitute for, or
complement to, Republican civic virtue. The Republican citizen is
motivated to virtue by a strong sense of solidarity and honor. For
the Pragmatist citizen, such dispositions are supplemented by social
circumstances that present them with the possibility of generally
valuable reforms in which they cannot clearly separate individual
from collective interests.
Note that the bootstrapping idea implies a different view of legal
process from the one often associated with the common law that
emphasizes the virtues of narrow controversies and case-by-case
decision making. In Cass Sunstein's recent version of the common
law perspective, by deciding "one case at a time" within narrow
frameworks, we get the benefits of "incompletely theorized agree-
ment."2 ' We resolve conflicts more readily by looking for a confined
space where differing views converge and bracketing broader issues
on which it will be harder to reach agreement." 9
126. See generally id.
127. See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Courts, supra note 4, at 852-65 (discussing the blurring of
traditional rules for judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys practicing in the context of a
treatment court).
128. CASS SUNSMN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 11 (1999).
129. Id. at 11-13.
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The Pragmatist approach has some kinship with this view. Part
of the idea of problem solving is to focus attention on matters that
are of practical importance to the participants and thus divert
attention from merely abstract, moot, or academic disagreement.
Defining issues in practical terms, however, is not the same as
defining them narrowly. In Pragmatist negotiation, problems have
a tendency to expand. A discussion about police responses to street
crime may implicate a landlord's tolerance of drug dealing or the
housing code agency's failure to cite the landlord for code violations,
or the park department's failure to light a neighboring public
facility at night. A discussion of failing student performances might
start out with a focus on the classroom practices of particular
teachers but might move to the patterns of collaboration and
supervision of the school as a whole.
Moreover, enlarging the problem has a tendency to increase the
bootstrap effect. As the problem is defined more broadly and the
spectrum of potential resolutions grows, the difficulty of mapping
self-interest, and the consequent openness to possibilities of mutual
benefit, intensifies. No doubt there are dangers of unconstrained
expansion of issues, but the Pragmatist approach emphasizes
advantages that the common law approach ignores.
b. Background Institutions
Negotiation takes place in the shadow of a court or other
governmental institution. These background institutions perform
three roles. First, they induce affected parties to negotiate and
ensure their representation. In particular, especially powerful
stakeholders may see no need to negotiate without pressure. Some
stakeholders may be excluded without central intervention on their
behalf. A common criticism of negotiated settlements, or "devolved
collaboration," in environmental regulation is that they are often
concluded without adequate representation of key stakeholders. For
example, the Quincy Library Group settlement between local
logging and resident interests in California's Plumas National
Forest, which has been approved in a federal statute and promoted
as a model for environmental regulatory negotiation, was concluded
without the participation of the United States Forest Service or any
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national environmental groups. 30 Luke Cole, reporting on three
negotiations by "local assessment committees" over a toxic waste
facility siting under a California statute, concludes that two were
unsuccessful because no one effectively represented poorer and
Latino residents of affected communities.'
31
The government can try to promote representation by prescribing
it as a condition of support or as a condition of giving legal efficacy
to negotiated arrangements. Local school councils, for example, in
"new accountability" educational reforms typically must have
designated numbers of representatives for parents and teachers,
elected by each constituency. Often, negotiation and representation
can be induced indirectly by the setting of defaults. Logging
interests that were previously unwilling to negotiate about the
Plumas forest were brought to the table by a federal regulation
drastically reducing the amount of timber they could harvest
without some kind of variance or waiver."' The Endangered Species
Act has induced landowners to negotiate over ecosystem governance
by effectively making large-scale development of many sites
impossible in the absence of local stakeholder agreement. 133
Representation of disadvantaged groups can be encouraged by
giving them strong rights to block settlements negotiated in their
absence. In many cities for example, strong resident rights to
challenge major real estate development encourage developers to
negotiate with community groups.13
It is not important that these default conditions be precise, and
indeed, it is often desirable that they be uncertain. The conditions
might then perform as a kind of "penalty default--a result that no
one wants, and thus gives everyone an incentive to search for
alternatives. 131
130. See 16 U.S.C. § 2104 (2004) (codifying the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group
Forest Recovery Act of 1998); Timothy P. Duane, Community Participation in Ecosystem
Management, 24 ECOLOGYL.Q. 771,784-97 (1997). See generally Sheila Foster, Environmental
Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459 (2002).
131. See generally Luke W. Cole, The Theory and Reality of Community-Based
Environmental Decision-Making: The Failure of California's Tanner Act and Its Implications
for Environmental Justice, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 733 (1999).
132. See Duane, supra note 130, at 786.
133. See Karkkainen, Adoptive Ecosystem Management, supra note 112, at 970-75.
134. See SIMON, supra note 69, at 69-78.
135. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
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Second, the background institutions provide support for the
negotiations. One or more of the parties may require professional
assistance, such as a mediator or facilitator, in structuring and
conducting the negotiation. To the extent that understanding of
the problem requires factual information or technical expertise,
researchers and experts may be helpful.
Archon Fung's study of local participation in school decentraliza-
tion and "community policing" reforms in Chicago gives examples.'36
Fung finds that participation in both processes is as extensive in
poor and minority neighborhoods as in others, and he finds evidence
of efficacy in poor and minority neighborhoods.'37 He also empha-
sizes the importance of support from the city. In one of the schools
where the parents' council seems to have made a difference, the
council was able to collaborate only after the school's poor perfor-
mance triggered the arrival of an intervention team of professionals
from the board of education. The team's report drew the council's
attention to issues they had not considered before and helped them
organize their discussions.3 8 Similarly, participation in setting
policing priorities in a mixed income district was dominated by
residents of its relatively affluent sector at the expense of poorer
neighborhoods until a facilitator provided by the police department
helped organize the meetings. The marginalization of the poorer
residents was apparently not deliberate; it arose from an unstruc-
tured style of conducting meetings that favored more self-confident
and articulate speakers. When the facilitator adopted a more
systematic approach, new voices emerged, and the group developed
consensus around a different set of priorities.
3 9
Third, the court or coordinate institutions give legal form or effect
to the solution and assist in monitoring and enforcement. The role
of the state is not to impose or divine an outcome, but to induce and
assist the parties to negotiate one and to assist in its implementa-
tion.
136. See generally FUNG ET AL., supra note 118.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 86-87.
139. See id. at 96-97.
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2. Rolling Rule Regimes
Just as every default rule is regarded as no more than a starting
point to be readily discarded as better options are discovered,
every negotiated consensus is a starting point for a continuous
effort of implementation. Legal Pragmatism resists the tendency in
some versions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution movement to
celebrate agreement as a definitive resolution of conflict. It makes
no strong distinction between negotiation and implementation.
Even if entirely in good faith, the parties will not be able to
anticipate the contingencies that arise in implementation. These
contingencies will generate new information and present both
challenges and learning opportunities. Thus, a pragmatist solution
incorporates procedures for self-revision.
Moreover, while Pragmatism does count deliberative negotia-
tion's potential to induce good will among participants as a virtue,
it does not rely more than marginally on altruism. The implementa-
tion regime is thus a regime of accountability designed to hold
participants to their commitments in a precise way.
The term "rolling rule regime" expresses this notion of implemen-
tation as a process of both learning and accountability. A rolling
rule regime includes process norms and performance norms. The
process norms specify how operations are conducted, such as how
teachers address a particular reading difficulty, how manufacturers
handle a toxic chemical, and how drug treatment providers respond
to client relapse. The performance norms measure the results of
such operations, such as the levels at which students read, the
amount of use or discharge of a toxic, and the degree of the addict's
self-control. Commonly, though not invariably, actors are assessed
primarily on the basis of performance norms.
Although actors typically must adopt explicit process norms, they
have discretion over which ones to adopt. In this approach, the
process norms are not a direct basis for sanction or reward, as the
performance norms play this role. The process norms have two
functions. First, they encourage systematic, self-conscious planning
and self-appraisal within each institutional actor. Explicit norms
make the practices easier to teach to those who were not part of the
discussions that produced them. Even for the participants, the
pressure to be explicit can enhance mutual understanding. Reliance
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on tacit understanding runs the risk that the parties are making
different assumptions without realizing it and the duty to explicate
one's assumptions can often clarify thought.
Second, process norms facilitate diagnosis and learning among
institutions. When actors lag in performance, outside evaluators
can more readily determine the problem when the practices are
explicitly defined. When actors perform well, their peers can learn
from their success by consulting their process norms. Thus, the
process norms of the most successful actors become "best practices"
available for incorporation by peer institutions. 14°
For example, in new accountability education reform, districts
and schools adopt improvement plans consisting of process norms.
Often, teachers must have explicit lesson plans for each class and
sometimes even explicit improvement plans for each student. The
institutions and the teachers get support from central institutions,
and struggling institutions and teachers receive firm direction, but
they will retain a range of discretion. They are then periodically
assessed by outcome measures, such as standardized test scores,
drop-out rates, attendance and truancy patterns, and completion of
college course requirements. Performance scores are publicly
reported and trigger rewards, sanctions, and assistance.
1 4
'
In the safety monitoring regime of the nuclear power industry,
plants must have detailed protocols for matters such as mainte-
nance and responses to operating irregularities. At the same time,
they are periodically assessed on such measures as radiation
emission levels, lost work time from any type of accident, and
unplanned shutdowns. Performance rankings based on these
measures are adjusted for plant size and distributed throughout the
industry and to regulators.
42
Norms in this type of regime have four key characteristics. The
first is continuous revision. The process is driven first by the
performance measures, as poor performance prompts review of the
actor's process norms and a search for better practice models among
140. These practices have been adopted from industrial management. See MICHEL GREIF,
THE VISUAL FACTORY: BUILDING PARTICIPATION THROUGH SHARED INFORMATION 173-260
(1991).
141. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 4, at 239-50.
142. See JOSEPH REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NuCLEAR
POWER SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 67-120 (1994); Doff & Sabel, supra note 4, at 371-
75.
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more successful peers. In addition, the performance norms them-
selves are also reconsidered. The participants have to be open to the
possibility that a poor score may indicate a defect in the measure,
rather than in the performance, or the possibility that, even if the
score is high, the norm is having counter-productive effects. If the
norm forces "teaching to the test" by focusing on a narrow range of
instruction that has little benefit outside the test, then there should
be discussion of changing or revising the test or supplementing it
with alternative measures.
The second characteristic of a rolling rule regime is local
experimentation. Actors must plan explicitly and collaboratively.
Schools need improvement plans. Drug treatment centers must
have treatment plans. Industries in Massachusetts must have
reduction plans for toxic use, yet they retain discretion over the
contents of the plans. The best performers are unconstrained. The
worst are more closely supervised but still retain discretion to tailor
the plan to their own assessments of local conditions.
The third characteristic of rolling rule regimes is scaling.
Conventional regulations are binary. They specify fixed conditions
of compliance in which an actor is either in compliance or not. In
contrast, a rolling performance measure often ranks the actor on a
graded metric. The California prison medical care assessment
system prescribes for the weighting of various performance
measures to produce a single audit score for each institution." The
Texas Public School Accountability System produces report cards
for each school that shows how the school ranks on various
measures in comparison to institutions with similar socioeconomic
student bodies."" The Toxics Release Inventory shows discharges
of specified toxics from each reporting facility in terms of numbers
of pounds."14 This approach gives more precise information than a
binary compliance norm. It enables identification of the more
serious failures among the lagging performers. It makes it possible
to measure improvement of a particular actor's performance." It
also yields information about the frontier of possibility from the
143. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1039-42 (2004).
144. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.052 (Vernon 2004).
145. See Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 289-90.
146. Id. at 286-87.
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superior performers. 147 The regimes often specify minimum
performance scores and attach consequences for failure to meet
them, but these minima are provisional. The expectation is that
they will ratchet up, as the leaders push back the frontiers. This
might be the expectation in a conventional regime of binary norms
as well, but unlike a rolling rule regime, the enforcement of a
binary regime does not itself generate the information needed for
revision of the norms.'48
Finally, rolling rule regimes require standardization to facilitate
comparability. Comparative assessment is only possible when
performance is measured in common terms. Thus, a key rule of
central institutions in a rolling rule regime is to devise and
propagate common metrics. Standardized tests perform this role in
education. Some regimes provide an explicit structure designed to
facilitate comparison. Thus, the Texas education regime constructs,
for each school a set of socio-economically comparable peers against
which it is compared on various dimensions. 49 The Toxics Release
Inventory is less structured. It simply mandates disclosure of
discharges in terms of a simple metric-pounds-along with
accompanying information about the nature of the facility. Users
can combine the data in various ways, depending on their interests.
For example, they can determine discharge in relation to facility
size or density of surrounding population. 50
From the point of view of system design, the key task is to devise
measures that are uniform and that track the dimensions in which
comparative measurement is most important. Some earlier school
testing regimes produced scores that were valid only at the district
level, rather than the school level. This is inadequate for a system
that gives basic initiative to schools. A test system that reports only
school averages risks overlooking the shortchanging of poor or
147. Id. at 300-02.
148. Not all regimes that invoke pragmatist themes and rhetoric have this scaled quality.
For example, the fair labor practice norms of the Social Accountability 8000 standards are
binary and lead to a single categorical judgment regarding certification. See Social
Accountability International, SA8000 Overview, at http/www.cepaa.org/SA8000.htm (last
visited Sept. 9, 2004). From a Legal Pragmatist point of view, this is a serious failing. The
standard would be more effective if it formulated scaled performance metrics and mandated
disclosure of audit assessments.
149. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 4, at 241.
150. See Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 261.
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minority students in mixed-race or mixed-income schools. Thus, the
new systems typically report separately for different racial and
income groups.' 5 '
Viewed in jurisprudential terms, the rolling rule regime repre-
sents an important contribution to the analysis of the choice
between rules and standards. We saw that Legal Liberalism tends
to opt for rules for people it does not trust and standards for people
it trusts. Both moves prove disappointing because the rule maker
never has enough information to frame or enforce the rules
properly, and standards-based decision making tends to become
inconsistent and unaccountable.
In contemporary industrial practice, as pioneered in the Japanese
automobile industry, however, the Pragmatists found a type of
normative approach that is not captured by the idea of either rule
or standard as they appear in the legal literature.'52 In the Toyota
manufacturing system, the practice of most workers is specified by
minutely detailed written norms. 5 ' Viewed statically, these norms
are conventional rules, but viewing them statically ignores an
important dimension. In practice, situations frequently arise in
which it is impossible or inappropriate to follow the rules. One
approach to such a situation that is characteristic of other produc-
tion systems is to build into the rules some standard exception for
extraordinary situations, or simply to afford tacit discretion to
disregard the rules when following them would be counterproduc-
tive. The Toyota approach is different, as ad hoc adjustments to
unforeseen circumstances are discouraged. The preferred response
is to suspend operations in order to consider what is wrong with the
norms, to revise them in accordance with specified procedures that
look somewhat like stakeholder negotiation, and then to recom-
mence in accordance with the restated norms.154
151. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 4, at 207-13, 246-49.
152. The seminal Pragmatist work is Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The
Institutions of Economic Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMnC SOCIOLOGY 138-65
(Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994).
153. GREiW, supra note 140, at 65-68.
154. See Adler, supra note 104, at 97, 103-04; see also Mathilde Bourrier, Elements for
Designing a Self-Correcting Organisation: Examples from Nuclear Power Plants, in SAFETY
MANAGEMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 133 (Andrew R. Hale & Michael S. Baram eds.,
1998).
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The process thus combines, in a manner not contemplated by
rules-and-standards jurisprudence, the form of the rule with the
continuous adjustment to unanticipated particularity associated
with the standard. Of course, decisions vary in the extent to which
they lend themselves to formalization. And there are different
avenues to formalization; paradigmatic examples can be used
instead of indicative commands. The basic idea is to capture as
explicitly as is feasible a constantly changing practice.
The kind of industrial practice exemplified by Toyota appears to
have influenced recent practice with respect to social policy. In their
study of school reform, Liebman and Sabel observe in some of the
most notable developments, such as the much admired work of
District 2 in Manhattan, a trend toward practices that combine
formalization with continuous self-assessment and revision in ways
analogous to the Toyota system and quite foreign to the rules vs.
standards analysis.' The traditional conception of professional
practice is based on standards. Practice takes the form of partly
tacit knowledge informally communicated among peers through
observation of exemplary performances and case studies. But the
new approaches in places like District 2 demand systematic
articulation and assessment of practices through detailed lesson
and student improvement plans and standardized testing.
3. Transparency
The third operating premise is transparency, or open access to
information. The premise applies at two levels. At the level of
stakeholder negotiations, the parties must commit to volunteer
material information. This is a prerequisite for both trust and
effective learning.
At a general level, transparency is essential to the kind of
information pooling that facilitates peer comparisons and the
learning they generate. Thus, we have seen that an important role
of background institutions is both to develop metrics to facilitate the
comparison of data across institutions and to create incentives for
these institutions to make information available." 6
155. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 4, at 221-23.
156. See, e.g., supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46:127
SOLVING PROBLEMS VS. CLAIMING RIGHTS
The Pragmatist view of transparency involves a significant
challenge to the Legal Liberal's values of confidentiality and lawyer
information control. Pragmatism can probably accommodate a
limited confidentiality for intimate matters and perhaps propri-
etary business information, but it is committed to oppose broad
professional evidentiary privileges and confidentiality duties,
weak discovery and disclosure systems, and compressed, histrionic,
partisan-dominated trial proceedings. The Citizen Perspective and
the Associative Democracy principles also suggest that, where
direct participation in public decision making is possible, it should
not be strongly dependent on professional representatives.
The Pragmatist program thus rejects the bar's argument for
confidentiality as a safe harbor in which people can make disclo-
sures they would otherwise be afraid to make to lawyers who will
channel them along law-abiding paths. Among many objections to
this view, two are especially salient in Legal Pragmatism. First, at
most, the bar's argument promises compliance with established
requirements. 151 In a regime of continuous revision, this is insuffi-
cient. For the latter purpose, any information that might disclose
problems with or potential improvements to the rules is relevant.
Disclosure may be important even where there is compliance with
the rules in their current formulation.
Second, the lawyers' approach to confidentiality deals with a real
need in a crude and heavy-handed way. The real need is to induce
transparency. The lawyer's approach is a categorical safe harbor for
disclosures, as long as they are made to lawyers. This approach is
overinclusive, since it immunizes many disclosures that would be
made anyway or that have little social value because the lawyer's
response does not lead to compliance. It is also underinclusive
because it is limited to lawyers.
Consider again the question of disclosure of medical errors. A
regime of continuous improvement would require pooling of
information by hospitals about both errors and efforts to correct
them. If such disclosure would expose them to a massive increase
in lawsuits and damage judgments, however, the hospitals would
feel constrained to forego it. For their part, the trial lawyers invoke
157. Even in this context, the argument is unconvincing. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHIcS 54-62 (1998).
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the Legal Liberal principle of confidentiality and lawyer informa-
tion control to insist that the only confidential disclosures the
hospitals can make are to their lawyers. Discussions with lawyers,
of course, are of little use for the purpose of systemic improve-
ment.s 8
The commitment to transparency implies a corresponding
disposition against harsh punitive sanctioning. Pragmatism tends
to favor soft enforcement. Failure triggers supportive intervention
first. When it does trigger coercive sanctions, they are often mild or
indirect, such as the shaming associated with publicly disclosed
poor performance. Sometimes severe but vague sanctions, in the
nature of penalty defaults to induce negotiations, are threatened,
but they are seldom applied." 9 Of the characteristic sanctions in
pragmatist regimes, the most severe involve not punishment, so
much as loss of control. The ultimate sanction prescribed for failure
in public institutions is receivership.
The Texas Public School Accountability System is an especially
well-developed example. It forces broad public disclosure of a large
amount of information pertinent to assessing school performance,
but indicia of poor performance do not lead immediately to harsh
consequences. Indeed, poor performers initially receive targeted
resources to assist them in improvements. The main sanctions
involve loss of autonomy, such as increased supervision by central
authorities and ultimately receivership, but these are gradually
phased in over time."6
Pragmatism has three reservations about punitive enforcement.
First, failure often arises from incapacity rather than deliberate
action.'' If this is the case, punishment may simply aggravate the
situation. Critics assert that some high stakes testing reforms that
attach substantial financial rewards or penalties for teachers and
principals to student performance on standardized tests are
misguided. 6 ' Some of these tests measure performance in ways that
provide relatively little diagnostic information pertinent to teaching
158. See INSTI;TrE OF MEDICINE, To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDINGA SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 86-
131 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
159. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
160. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 4, at 209-10.
161. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 13-15.
162. E.g., ALFIE KOHN, THE CASE AGAINST STANDARDIZED TESTING: RAISING THE SCORES,
RUINING THE SCHOOLS (2000).
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practices. Moreover, most poor performers require some assistance
to identify and rectify the practices associated with their poor
performances. The 1996 welfare reform legislation has also been
criticized for combining arbitrarily strict outcome standards with
counter-productively harsh sanctions.16 Such measures seem to
invoke the rhetoric of decentralization and experimentation to
cosmeticize recklessly draconian cutbacks. The regimes most
consistent with the Pragmatist view downplay tangible sanctions
and emphasize assistance for change.
Second, severe punishment requires a considerably higher level
of information than softer or less hostile interventions. For any
intervention, the regulator has to calculate both the compliance
threshold that will trigger it and its proper magnitude. Severe
punitive interventions may be less reversible than others and hence
require more planning and information. If severe sanctions cause
a school or a plant to close, it may not be easy to reconstitute it.
Moreover, the prospect of severe sanctions triggers defensive
responses on the part of those facing the sanctions and invokes
expensive legal procedures. The evidentiary threshold the courts
require to sustain a punitive regulation or its application in a
particular case is often expensive and sometimes prohibitive. By
contrast, softer interventions can be made informally.
Finally, the prospect of severe punishment increases the costs of
transparency to some participants and encourages them to distort
or resist disclosure. At worst, it induces fraud. "High stakes testing"
in education appears to have inspired a substantial amount of
cheating and misreporting by teachers.1 At best, it discourages
voluntary disclosure and fuels claims for confidentiality or propri-
etary rights with respect to information of public importance. The
recent increase in criminal prosecutions for lying to federal
investigators or congressional committees may have had a bigger
effect in discouraging people from volunteering information for fear
they will inadvertently incur liability than in deterring deliberate
lying. 6 ' The tendency we noted above of witnesses to refuse to
163. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121, 1178-87 (2000).
164. Fung, supra note 121, at 98.
165. Jeffrey Rosen, The Perjury Trap, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 10, 1998, at 28.
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speak in Congressional hearings without the presence of lawyers is
sometimes explained in these terms.
Pragmatist programs tend to reserve the most severe sanctions
for violation of disclosure duties. Examples of approaches in this
spirit are safe harbors for accurate disclosure, ranging from the
South African Truth Commission'6 to the products liability
provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts that give manufac-
turers immunity from tort damages if they comply with applicable
administrative regulations and disclose any information they have
suggesting that the regulations are inadequate.'67 Similarly, the
enforcement activity most emphasized in these regimes is the
independent auditing of performance assessment reports. To an
extent, these programs are premised on the idea that, if the
integrity of the information is assured, proper conduct will follow
without punishment.
The Pragmatists emphasize that, without formal state-imposed
sanctions, transparency can trigger informal pressures for compli-
ance. Clearly, to the extent that noncompliance results from
incapacity, and transparency succeeds in exposing both poor
performance and the methods associated with adequate perfor-
mance, it can be self-enforcing. Moreover, private producers
sometimes discover that compliance with regimes designed to
achieve social goals has unanticipated synergies with cost-cutting
and product quality strategies that enhance profitability."6 It also
seems clear that pride in good performance and shame at bad
performance will create incentives of compliance in a regime of
transparent performance ranking. 169
For private producers, reputation potentially influenced by
performance rankings can affect profitability through customer
choices. A sufficiently large fraction of consumers of some products
are influenced by concerns on such matters as a maker's labor or
166. See Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 355 (1999).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 (1997).
168. See Sally L. Goodman & Det Norske Veritas, Is 14001 an Important Element in
Business Survival?, available at http://www.iso14000.com/Implementation/DNVArticle.htm
(last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
169. Rees attributes substantial effects to forces of honor and shame associated with intra-
industry disclosure of safety performance rankings in the nuclear power industry. REES, supra
note 142, at 106-18.
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environmental practices for manufacturers to be intensely con-
cerned about their public images with respect to these matters.
Such concerns have prompted many garment manufacturers to
sign up for various monitoring regimes. General Motors and Ford
are among the companies which require all of their suppliers to
have their environmental practices certified under the International
Standard Organization's environmental management norms, also
known as ISO 14001,17° apparently out of concern for public
relations.
No doubt the strength of the customer reputation effect varies
with issue and product, but it can be large. As this is being written,
a major decline in the value of Martha Stewart's media company is
being attributed in substantial part to the effect on her image of her
indictment and conviction in connection with trading in the stock of
Imclone. As the loss in value is in the range of hundreds of millions
of dollars, the potential formal sanction is trivial in comparison.
In the public sphere, transparent assessment regimes can
interact with the electoral process. School reforms often accompany
rolling rule regimes with the establishment or invigoration of
elected school site councils, sometimes with powers to hire and fire
principals. The report card sent to parents by the Texas regime is
designed in part to influence their votes for local school officials.
Local public officials may consider the performance rankings of
industries in deciding how to exercise their discretion with respect
to such matters as land use permissions, regulatory waivers, or the
allocation of business subsidies. Industries may strive to avoid low
ratings for fear that, even though no punitive sanctions are
currently provided, they may prompt citizens to push for harsh
sanctions in the future, or that courts may decide that they indicate
that tort duties of care have been violated.'72 Such vague back-
ground threats of liability may be far more effective than specific
and explicit ones. Performance rankings are more easily revisable,
170. Companies Encouraging IS014001 Registration, available at httpJ/www.isol4000.
com/Registered/ViewDatabase.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
171. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Prosecuting Martha Stewart: Marketplace, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2003, at C1.
172. NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND
ENVIRONMENT 28-35 (2003) (describing a cross-country study of paper mills finding extensive
overcompliance with environmental regulation and explaining it in part on the basis of
expectations of increasing regulatory severity).
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less likely to generate expensive legal challenges, and more likely
to prompt productive discussion and negotiation.
Some combination of these informal pressures apparently
explains the success of the federal Toxics Release Inventory and the
Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act.'73 The federal statute
requires only public disclosure of toxic discharges. The Massachu-
setts act requires a plan for reducing toxic use, but does not
mandate any quantity of reduction. The statutes only impose
sanctions for failure to disclose and, in the Massachusetts case, to
plan, yet both appear to have induced substantial reductions in
toxic pollution.'74
The transparency commitment implies a loss for lawyers of the
comparative advantage that the attorney-client evidentiary
privilege gives them over their competitors and a concurrent need
to develop new practice models. Conventional litigation practice and
the forms of transactional practice dominated by distributive
bargaining are both unsuited to Pragmatist problem solving.
Recently, lawyers have been experimenting with different practice
styles in connection with Alternative Dispute Resolution; and in
business contexts, lawyers, often pushed by their clients, have been
exploring collaborative problem-solving approaches.'75 These latter
styles of practice seem more promising from a Pragmatist perspec-
tive.
IV. TwO CASE STUDIES
Pragmatists are inclined to pursue their ideas in particular
practical contexts. Since much recent Pragmatist work takes the
form of case studies, we can best pursue the themes of Legal
Pragmatism by looking at two of them: Michael Dorf and Charles
Sabel's study of drug courts and Susan Sturm's study of second
generation employment litigation.'76 In each case, I first summarize
the authors' account of the operations in question, emphasizing how
they approximate the operating premises of Legal Pragmatism,
173. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 21, § 1 (2004).
174. Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 286-94, 354-56.
175. See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression ofBusiness Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 679,679-83 (1996).
176. See generally Dorf & Sabel, Drug Courts, supra note 4; Sturm, supra note 4.
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then consider how they implicate the Pragmatist background
premises of Citizenship, Associational Democracy, and the Priority
of Solutions.
A. Drug Courts
The drug court idea emerged in the 1990s in response to the
burden on courts and prisons resulting from the explosion in drug
prosecutions, as well as continuing doubts about the efficacy of
traditional punishment practices for drug-related offenses." There
are now more than 400 local drug courts around the country,
encouraged by grants from the federal government and various
foundations.
It has long been recognized that the traditional criminal justice
paradigm fits poorly with many nonviolent, drug-related crimes.
This paradigm treats each prosecution as a self-contained episode
of wrongdoing, which it seeks to resolve by a discrete punishment.
From the defense perspective of Legal Liberalism, a key role for the
defense lawyer is to impede, as much as possible, the access of the
prosecution and the court to inculpatory information. The defense
lawyer will pressure the defendant not to volunteer information,
will seek to exclude information that was improperly procured, and
will attack incomplete or ambiguous features of the prosecution's
case. More commonly, she will negotiate away the defendant's right
to these maneuvers in return for a reduced punishment.'
An addiction-related criminal act is virtually always a continuing
phenomenon. Without effective treatment, the defendant is highly
likely to return to the system. To the extent that effective treatment
is possible, the defendant shares an interest with the community
in receiving treatment. Punishment is expensive, and the purely
retributive concerns with crimes of this sort are small. Thus, courts
have long been willing to trade punishment for treatment as a
condition of probation. What is new about the drug courts is the
way treatment is made the central institutional focus (rather than,
say, relegated to a peripheral probation department) and the way
the court's processes are structured.
177. Dorf& Sabel, Drug Courts, supra note 4, at 841-43, 846.
178. See generally Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway? Musings of a Public
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37 (2000).
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In the most common drug court model, if the defendant asks and
the prosecutor consents, charges are filed in the drug court. If the
defendant concedes guilt, treatment becomes the focus of the
proceedings. The defendant, the court's staff, and one or more
treatment providers under contract with the court negotiate a
treatment plan. The plan puts the defendant in one of several
treatment bands, which specifies obligations on the part of the
defendant and the service provider, as well as sanctions for non-
compliance. The band determines the defendant's duties, including
the frequency of urine testing, program attendance, court appear-
ances and case management meetings. A schedule of sanctions is
specified for different infractions. The program treats infractions as
normal in the sense of likely, but it also emphasizes the importance
of calibrated sanctions. Compliance is rewarded by progression
through less and less restrictive bands. At each stage, the defendant
gets more autonomy. 1
79
The defendant appears periodically before the judge, accompa-
nied by a report on his progress by the primary treatment provider.
In the event of an infraction, the judge decides from a menu of
specified sanctions. The judge can also consider proposals for
modification of the plan. The treatment plan is individualized in
two limited respects. First, the plan matches the defendant to the
most appropriate of the several patterned bands. Second, there is
also some discretion within each band to tailor the plan to the
defendant's specific needs and to revise the plan in light of the
defendant's experience. And the bands themselves are revised in
the light of program-wide experience."S
At the same time that the court is monitoring the defendant, it is
monitoring its treatment providers, and the court itself is being
monitored by a network of government and nongovernmental
organizations.18 ' Subcontracting with multiple treatment providers
allows the court to compare their performances, to encourage
learning among contractors, and to sanction or terminate poor
performers. The same data can be used to evaluate the court's own
overall performance by the Department of Justice's Office of Justice
Programs or the Drug Court Standards Committee of the National
179. Dorf& Sabel, Drug Courts, supra note 4, at 845-49.
180. Id. at 847-50.
181. Id. at 844-46, 862-64.
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Association of Drug Court Professionals. Data can be collected and
compared on such indicators as program completion rates, recidi-
vism rates, and program cost. These organizations provide technical
assistance and facilitate exchange of information among programs.
In principle, transparency is extensive. The defendant must
submit to extensive surveillance of his personal life. All data on his
course of treatment is available to the judge and team of profession-
als working with him. For their part, subcontractors and the court
must make aggregate data on results and diagnostic information
relevant to explaining success or failure. Assessments comparing
the performance of the drug courts to more traditional approaches
are encouraging." 2
Now consider how these programs implicate the background
principles of Citizenship, Associative Democracy, and Problem
Solving. First, Citizenship. These programs arise from'a self-
conscious rejection of the Victim Perspective as applied to drug
addiction. The Victim Perspective tended to argue against punitive
or coercive responses to addiction on the grounds that, first,
addiction resulted from social conditions for which the victim should
not be blamed, and second, somewhat contradictorily, that effective
treatment could not be coercively imposed. The preferred remedy
was thus decriminalization coupled with the expansion of voluntary
services.
The drug court movement was influenced by recent research
suggesting that, in fact, addicts are as likely to respond to coercive
as to voluntary treatment, perhaps more likely." 3 These studies
suggest that repeated relapses are normal, even in successful cases,
and that they are minimized by a schedule of certain but graded
sanctions and rewards. Although the orientation of these studies is
medical rather than political, the approach they prescribe associ-
ates autonomy and responsibility in the manner of the Citizenship
idea. Drug courts subject the defendant to a potentially infantilizing
loss of autonomy, but this deprivation is premised on the conceded
fact that through addiction he has lost at least some of the capacity
for responsible action. The program involves the defendant in
planning for his own treatment. It responds to demonstrations of
182. Id. at 851 n.50.
183. Id. at 842 n.23.
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increased responsibility with reduced supervision. At least in
principle, the program makes itself accountable to the defendant for
providing the services in the negotiated plan.
Second, Associative Democracy. The first of the current drug
courts was established in Dade County, Florida, in response to local
protests over the harshness and ineffectuality of conventional
responses to drug cases. 114 When the Department of Justice under
Janet Reno, who had been Dade County District Attorney when the
Florida experiment occurred, sought to encourage such programs,
it stipulated as a condition of support that a local team of court
personnel, including prosecutors and defense lawyers, be consti-
tuted to plan and monitor the project. Many drug courts are
community courts with narrow, geographically defined jurisdictions.
Such courts encourage community participation through advisory
boards, community mediation panels, victim-offender impact
panels, and town hall meetings.185 Many of the service providers
who provide treatment and participate in revision and evaluation
of the treatment providers are local nongovernmental organizations.
The Priority of Solutions operates at two levels. At the level of the
individual, it broadens the view of what is at stake from an isolated
episode of wrongdoing to that of a long-term condition, and
emphasizes the possibilities for mutual gain through treatment. At
the same time, it treats the negotiated resolution as a starting point
to be improved in the course of experience. At the systemic level,
the Solutions principle appears in the program's self-conception,
not as a mechanism for resolving discrete disputes or vindicating
an established set of entitlements, but as a provisional, revisable
approach to a social problem.
B. Second Generation Employment Discrimination'
First generation employment discrimination claims tended to
involve allegations of disparate treatment, such as explicit policies
or practices directly disadvantaging women or minority groups. The
characteristic legal response was a lawsuit for damages for the
184. Id. at 843-45.
185. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAw
& POLVY 125, 127 (2001).
186. See generally Sturm, supra note 4.
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identifiable victims or an injunction forbidding the discriminatory
practices. Second generation claims tend to involve allegations of
disparate impact, or practices that are not discriminatory on their
face but seem to produce effects that consistently disadvantage
women or minorities. Salient examples of second generation claims
are claims based on subjective hiring and promotion practices and
sexual harassment claims that allege a hostile work environment.
In both cases, the defendant employer responds that it has merely
delegated authority to lower tier decision makers, invariably with
instructions not to discriminate. Most often, the employer will claim
to have been unaware of any discriminatory acts, and sometimes
there will have been no overt acts. The plaintiffs case consists
mainly of a showing that, say, women are disproportionately passed
over in hiring and promotion or that they are not comfortable in, or
tend to leave, the allegedly hostile environment. The courts have
indicated that plaintiffs can establish liability with disparate
impact evidence. First generation remedies, however, seem
unsatisfactory in this context. The wrongs in question are not
susceptible to redress by specific negative injunctions, and damage
awards do not directly change the workplace or give the defendant
notice about what it must do to avoid further liability.1
7
Susan Sturm has studied a range of responses to this situation.
Some responses have been negotiated in the course of litigation or
in anticipation of litigation, and some have been undertaken
voluntarily by firms concerned about employee morale and reten-
tion. Regardless of how they originate, the responses share
characteristics of Pragmatist practice. The structures in question
are typically instituted after extensive consultation with rank-and-
file employees and are designed to facilitate continued consultation.
Management might be able to impose a regime of its own devising;
so might the employees if they prevailed in litigation. But both sides
concede that they lack the understanding to devise an effective
remedy without the other. If the remedy arises from a lawsuit, it is
negotiated with employees' counsel and perhaps with direct
participation by some employees. If there is a union, the union will
be involved. In addition, informal employee identity groups may
sometimes participate. The employer can form a task force with
187. Id. at 484-89.
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employee representation or it can invite or solicit employee views
through systematic interviewing, telephone hot lines, or grievance
procedures."s
Managers are required to state as explicitly as is feasible the
criteria for hiring and promotion and, when they deviate from the
articulated criteria, to justify the deviation. The structures involve
continuous monitoring based on benchmarks, goals, and indicators
of various kinds, including data on hiring and promotions by race
or gender. Goals are often specified and progress toward the goals
is measured and compared with performances of comparable units.
As analysis identifies more specific problems, diagnostic indicators
are established. Where lack of training is an obstacle to female or
minority promotion, the provision of training can be monitored in
relation to the relevant category. Promotional data can also be
assessed by gender and race relative to a given amount of
training."8 9 In an accounting firm where one barrier to women
advancing was their disproportionate failure to get the assignments
that led to the most valuable training and contacts, assignments
were monitored by gender. Where lengthy out-of-town assignments
were identified as a problem for women in balancing work and
family, the number and length of such assignments was
monitored."9 Ad hoc grievances can be examined for patterns, and
the indicators revised as new patterns are discovered. One company
assesses the efficacy of its internal grievance process by comparing
complaints made through this process with outside complaints,
including lawsuits and complaints to public agencies. 9'
Transparency is important to these regimes in various ways.
Data on benchmarks and indicators is available to managers. If
there is a consent decree, it is likely to be available to representa-
tives of the employee class. Even without litigation, it may be
shared with employee representatives. Some companies share such
data with each other. An important part of some regimes is the
provision of information on training and promotion opportunities to
employees. At Home Depot, for example, a computer tracks
employee interests and training, notifies both employees and
188. Id. at 489-520.
189. See id. at 546-53.
190. Id at 492-99.
191. Id at 507.
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managers when a relevant job opens up, and sends notices to
monitors when ostensibly qualified workers are repeatedly
rejected.192
Note how the second generation approach resonates with the
background premises of Legal Pragmatism. The new remedial
regime implicates a shift in the understanding of discrimination
that parallels the distinction between the Citizen and Victim
Perspectives. The old paradigm implied that the plaintiff was a
victim because it treated the defendant as a villain and discrimina-
tion was seen as conscious and malicious wrongdoing. Research,
however, increasingly portrays important forms of discrimination
as a consequence of practices that are as likely perpetuated by
indifference or ignorance as by intention.193 It also appears that
discrimination often arises from basic cognitive practices of
categorization and generalization that do not involve malice.' 9 '
There are thus opportunities for learning through mutual engage-
ment. To the extent that the Victim Perspective excessively
moralizes the issues and engenders self-righteousness on the part
of the plaintiffs or defensiveness on the part of the defendants, it
can be counterproductive.
Second generation regimes always involve gestures toward
employee participation, ranging from, at the least ambitious,
procedures for individual grievances, to, at the most ambitious,
incorporation of employee groups into negotiation and monitoring.
In litigation, the class action decrees can institutionalize counter-
vailing power. However, without independent unions, initiatives
toward Associative Democracy in the workplace are subject to
suspicion about employer domination.
The Problem Solving Perspective appears from two dimensions.
One dimension is the recognition of an interest in fair treatment
shared by both the firm and employees, as illustrated by the fact
192. Sturm notes that the transparency on which Pragmatist approaches depend is in some
tension with current doctrine because tracking such data may make it easier for plaintiffs to
establish liability. Id. at 476. This counterproductive disincentive could be avoided by either
giving some limited or temporary immunity to employers for inculpatory data they generate
themselves, or, alternatively, by imposing a duty on all employers to collect such data.
193. Id. at 473.
194. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,1186-
88 (1995).
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that some of these regimes have been initiated voluntarily in
response to management-perceived recruitment and retention
problems. 9 The other dimension is the broadening of the frame-
work from a series of episodic conflicts with discrete static solutions
to a search for improved structures that contain procedures for
learning and self-revision.
V. AMBIGUITIES AND LIMITATIONS
So far, Legal Pragmatism consists of a set of theoretical intu-
itions and a series of case studies. The intuitions are explicitly
tentative and incomplete, and the case studies are necessarily
ambiguous. Most of them involve nascent experiments. Even if we
treat them as success stories, it remains unclear how far they can
be generalized. It is to Pragmatism's credit that it makes its
limitations so explicit by eschewing axiomatic formalism and
interpreting its findings modestly and tentatively. Yet both the
plausibility of Legal Pragmatism as a general orientation and the
capacity to apply it to particular problems are constrained by a
series of critical ambiguities.
In particular, there are four especially important concerns about
the practical approach suggested by the operating premises of
stakeholder negotiation, rolling rule regimes, and transparency. If
I focus on the operating premises, it is not because I regard the
background premises as less debatable. It is because the operating
premises seem the most original but least developed aspect of the
Pragmatist contribution.
A. Vagueness About Domain
Legal Pragmatism is sometimes ambiguous as to whether its
approach is a complement to Legal Liberalism that is better
adapted to some contexts, or rather a global competitor that could
occupy the entire field. Deliberative negotiation would seem to have
pre-conditions, as the parties have to have some uncertainty about
how the matter should be or will be resolved and they have to
believe that mutual gain is possible. The parties have to be capable
195. Sturm, supra note 4, at 493.
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of deliberation, which means treating each other with respect and
remaining open to learning. Clearly, these conditions are not
satisfied invariably.
The issue of the productivity of deliberation can arise from two
perspectives. First, the weaker party contemplating whether to
enter a negotiation has to consider whether she will be worse off
than if she takes a more aggressive course."9 She has to worry that
she will signal weakness to the opposing party. Or that the
negotiations will weaken her coalition by slowing things down, by
raising internally divisive issues, or by depriving them of the
possibility of a clear symbolic victory. She has to worry that,
because she lacks skills and information, she may be maneuvered
into a worse deal than she could get by fighting. For example, some
unions are reluctant to participate in labor standards monitoring
regimes of the sort the Pragmatists recommend for fear that their
involvement will be construed as an endorsement of high-scoring
firms. Apparently, they are reluctant to give endorsements because
they fear they will make mistakes and because they think they can
mobilize workers best with a clear message of militance.
Second, the legislator or policymaker contemplating whether to
encourage and support negotiation has to consider whether
negotiation will lead to a worse outcome from a public point of view
than alternative interventions."' One alternative to direct support
for negotiation would be a revision or reassignment of rights. We
could enhance the rights of the weaker party and then leave it to
that party to decide whether to negotiate in her strengthened
position. For example, if the problem is employment discrimination,
we could ease the plaintiffs burden of proof or make punitive
damages automatic. The plaintiffs default position-the net value
of her claim discounted for time and the risk of losing-would
increase, and so would her bargaining power in any negotiation she
decided to enter into. If the problem is non-violent addiction-related
crime, we could reduce the penalties for it.
196. See generally JOAN E. LANCOURT, CONFRONT OR CONCEDE: THE ALINSKY CITIZEN.
ACTION ORGANIZATIONS (1979).
197. See, for example, the critical appraisal of the sort of stakeholder negotiations
encouraged by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, in Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering
Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 411,446-58 (2000).
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Another alternative intervention would be to strengthen the
weaker party directly, say, by transferring resources or organizing
assistance. We could deal with discrimination by making it easier
to organize unions or respond to the drug addiction problem by
increasing the funding for public defenders.
The Pragmatist tends to respond to both the strategic actor and
the policymaker by emphasizing the indeterminacy of the situation.
There are risks to the strategic actor of negotiating, but there are
also potential benefits, and more often than not, it is impossible to
reliably assess their relative magnitude in advance of entering into
the negotiation. Of course, indeterminacy cuts both ways. It is as
much a reason to hold back as to leap forward. The Pragmatist's
presumption in favor of going forward seems to be based on a
predisposition to optimism and a belief that the strongest cultural
influences on many strategic actors are most likely to bias them
against negotiation.
B. Incomplete Sublimation of Distributive Issues
The Pragmatist approach requires the transcending of distribu-
tive bargaining. In distributive bargaining, people argue about their
current entitlements, about the position they would be in absent
agreement, and about the proper division of the savings and costs
of disputing that settlement would accomplish.
This kind of bargaining is inimical to Legal Pragmatism. It is
quite risky. It can fail because people estimate their default
positions incorrectly, because they lock themselves into aggressive
strategic postures, or because they want a symbolic or emotional
vindication that settlement would not provide. Moreover, distribu-
tive bargaining diverts energy and resources from the search for
mutually beneficial solutions.98
Yet distributive bargaining would seem hard to avoid. People
will not enter into negotiations unless they think they can do better
by doing so, and they will not agree to solutions unless they think
198. On the dynamics of distributive bargaining, see Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis
Kormhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950,
959-77 (1979). For the contrast between distributive and deliberative negotiation, see
Susskind, supra note 123, at 44-49.
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the solutions are better than their default positions. The process
depends on each participant having some sense of her default
position. Moreover, it will often be in the interests of parties to
persuade others that their default positions are worse than they
think they are. Thus, distributive bargaining seems inevitable, as
well as inimical.
We saw that the Pragmatists look to bootstrapping to mitigate
this problem. If the parties can be induced to bracket distributive
concerns and focus on common interests, then the creative explora-
tion of alternative responses may loosen their understanding of how
their selfish interests fit in the larger structure. This implies a
further prerequisite and limitation: the situation must be one in
which most stakeholders see the possibility of major collective
improvements in which they might share, but in which there is
major uncertainty about the relation between their selfish interests
and the general interest. This rules out situations in which some
major stakeholders are doing as well as they can imagine doing. It
also rules out situations where all of the options are fairly familiar
and well understood.
The case studies suggest that situations with the right
combination of possibility for gain and uncertainty arise with
some frequency, but they do not establish that most social disputes
or problems involve such situations. Where the prerequisite is not
satisfied spontaneously, the very uncertainty that bootstrapping
seeks to exploit will limit the ability of policymakers to generate it.
C. The Problem of Interest Representation
Legal Pragmatism has little to say about who has standing to
participate in stakeholder negotiations and how the views of
different participants are to be weighed in decision making. We
could limit standing to people with interests of a minimum size, and
we could weigh the views of participants in proportion to some
measure of the interests of the people they represent. It is, however,
extremely difficult to weigh interests and to assess the claims of
putative representatives to speak for a constituency. 199
199. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1667, 1723-47 (1975).
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The Pragmatists believe that these difficulties are less troubling
for their approach than for others. The function of negotiation for
them is not to identify and aggregate interests. It is a search for the
common good. The hope is that such a process will produce deci-
sions that non-participants will recognize as good. Failing that,
legitimacy depends on showing nonparticipants, not that they were
represented in any agency sense, but that their views were
considered."° For these purposes, weighing interests is neither
necessary nor desirable. What is important is that the full range of
views in the society are expressed and considered. They should be
considered, moreover, not on the basis of the magnitude of the
interests the speaker represents, but in terms of their persuasive-
ness. Thus, we can dispense with complex standing rules in favor
of a presumption of inclusion, and with weighing rules, in favor of
a consensus standard for decision.
These responses are not entirely satisfactory. There needs to be
some limits on inclusion, and consensus will often be impossible.
More importantly, even where consensus is reached after good faith,
high-quality deliberation, the pre-existing organization of interests
will affect the negotiations and the decision. The best organized and
financed groups and interests will tend to be better represented and
have more chance of influencing the deliberation. Even if we
assume they are thoroughly principled deliberators, they will be
more articulate, more skilled at negotiation procedure, and better
able to document their claims.
Pragmatists recognize this problem and prescribe that the state
or nongovernmental organization sector assist underorganized
groups and interests.201 The problem is that that task would seem
to require something like the weighing of interests that Legal
Pragmatism sought to avoid through deliberation. How can we
decide which underorganized groups and interests should be given
support and how much support they should be given without some
weighing of interests?
200. See MICHELMAN, supra note 35, at 60.
201. See Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Countervailing Power in Empowered
Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN
EMPowERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 259-89 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds.,
2003).
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D. The Reversion Danger
In the Legal Liberal perspective, people are most often arguing
about what they are entitled to because of what happened in the
past. They back up their assertions by interpretations of legal
authority and evidence of past conduct. The Legal Pragmatist
perspective tries to bypass such issues by focusing on solutions.
Deliberating about solutions involves predictions about the future,
and the principal way parties back up these assertions is by
agreeing to submit to accountability regimes involving performance
measurement and rewards and sanctions.
We have seen that uncertainty about how selfish interests will fit
in a reformed regime plays a critical role in the initial deliberation.
At best, however, this uncertainty operates only ex ante. Once the
regime is up and running, people's roles will become more defined
and their sense of self-interest will be clearer. Of course, Pragmatist
regimes aspire to revise themselves continuously, so there is always
an element of uncertainty and open possibility about the future. But
after the initial round, the accountability mechanisms have to be
applied, and this entails some assessment of past performance.
Parties will have definite selfish interests with respect to this
assessment.
Both the initial round and every subsequent round anticipates
the problem of differing interests in assessment by specifying
performance measures as much as possible, but these standards
have to be provisional. Thus, every occasion for the assessment of
performance is also an occasion for the assessment of the standards.
Every measurement of performance is at once potentially an
indication of good or bad performance or an indication that
something is wrong with the measures. Thus, there is the risk that
distributive conflict will break out every time the accountability
mechanisms are applied. Cooperation under the new regime may
develop a solidarity that inhibits opportunism. Although to the
extent that Legal Pragmatism depends on solidarity, that repre-
sents a further limiting condition that will not be present in many
circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
The idea of Legal Pragmatism elaborated here captures some
distinctive features of recent public interest practice and connects
it to the complementary philosophical perspective of Deweyan
pragmatism.
Recent practice reflects an increased emphasis on options for
joint gain, as opposed to redistribution; on continuous and pervasive
participation, as opposed to episodic proceedings controlled by
lawyers and judges; and on transparency as an inducement to both
compliance with obligation and to learning. Perhaps the most basic
theme has been the understanding of law practice as a form of
collective learning, as opposed to redistribution or balancing power.
This theme resonates strongly with Dewey's idea of participatory
democracy. Dewey, however, was vague about the specific forms
such participation might take and about the institutional support
it would require. Recent practice suggests how his vision might be
elaborated.
Nevertheless, there is a risk that my contrast of Legal
Pragmatism and the older tendencies I have called Legal Liberal-
ism exaggerates the relevant differences and underestimates the
continuing importance of the preoccupations of Legal Liberalism.
Legal Liberalism has been centrally preoccupied with imbalances
of power and wealth and with background entitlements that
determine people's options in the event that negotiation fails. It
would be reckless to ignore its warning that the search for collective
gain risks coercing the most vulnerable or underappreciating their
interests. The most collaborative negotiation will necessarily be
influenced by the participants' assumptions about the background
rights of the participants, rights Legal Liberals may be better
equipped to define and debate than Legal Pragmatists.
Like most ideological and academic debates, the argument may
be less a matter of choice between irreconcilable perspectives than
a matter of emphasis among partially dissonant but mutually
interdependent themes. Whether we view it as an alternative to
Legal Liberalism or a complement to it, Legal Pragmatism deserves
credit for enriching the discourse and practice of public interest
lawyering.
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